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THIS book is an attempt to deal in somewhat
cursory fashion with large metaphysical pro
blems. Questions of Philosophy almost neces
sarily involve an abstruse mode of treatment,
intricate details, and a technical phraseology,
which make them difficult and repellent to the
majority of the reading public ; while the attempt
to treat them in a simple and broad manner,
without the use of a peculiar nomenclature,
seems fore-doomed to ignore their complexity
and arduousness. Whether it is possible to steer
clear of either misfortune is, perhaps, doubtful :
all that I have tried to do in the following pages
is to avoid prolixity, and to set as clearly as I
could before the reader the main issue between
rival systems. Originality I cannot and do not
claim.n PEEFACE.
That Mr. Mill s logical and psychological spe
culations distinctly raise metaphysical questions
is in itself a proof of the reality of Metaphysics.







brings inevitably in its train metaphysical
problems. Even a physiologist like Mr. George
Henry Lewes finds, in his
&quot; Problems of Life
and Mind,&quot; that the Positive Philosophy must
seek to lay, as best it can, the Metaphysical
ghost, which is ever starting up with awkward
persistence to confront experimental psychology
and demonstrated materialism.
It only remains for me to acknowledge assist
ance received from one or two friends, especially
Mr. F. H. Bradley, Fellow of Merton College,
Oxford. Most of all, however, I am indebted to
Professor Green s Introduction to the Philosophy
of Hume, a work to which many of these pages
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THE future of metaphysical speculation is the
question which is more and more agitating the
modern philosophic mind. Is it doomed to yield
to the conquering inroads of
&quot;
Science,&quot; is it, in Mr.
Lewes language
&quot; to be crushed into dust beneath
the chariot wheels of modern thought ?
&quot; Or is there
yet a region into which Science has never come, into
which it cannot come, because Scientific methods
cannot be applied to the source and fountain-head of
all method whatsoever ? Such a question can only be
approached when it has become clear with what sort
of problems metaphysics deals : it cannot be sum
marily despatched by the assertion that every such
problem, when
&quot;
rationally stated,&quot; is capable of2 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
solution by
&quot; the inductions and deductions from
experience.&quot;
The contention of the opponents of metaphysics is
that it is totally unpregressive. Here again the whole
question turns upon the nature of the progress to be
demanded, the character of those landmarks by which
advance, retrogression, and lateral oscillation are
severally to be estimated. Especially in the judgment
to be passed upon a particular philosophical writer,
like John Stuart Mill, is it necessary to begin with a
preliminary view of intellectual movements in the
higher questions of philosophy, if we are in any way
to determine the position he is to occupy, and the
value to be attributed to his labours. And it is only
possible adequately to do this, after a general survey
of the lines on which Modern Philosophy has moved
for two centuries from Descartes to Hegel.
The period, commencing in the sixteenth century
and ending in the eighteenth, exhibits three great
movements. At the outset there is the vast dogmatic
system of Scholasticism. At the close there is another
dogmatic system, rising into prominence, a dogmatism
which attempts to construct an ontology out of
thought, the system of Hegel. And midway be
tween the two, in the interspace between the two
dogmatisms, there is a period wherein thought in its
, newly-found emancipation is running riot in different
lines, touching the problems on every side, enquiringINTRODUCTORY. 3
critical, tentative, everything but dogmatic, going a
few steps in one direction, and then, dissatisfied, turn
ing back on its footsteps and essaying another path,
building up only to destroy a great transitional
period, paving the way for a great constructive epoch
in the future.
Is there any one description which will suit this
period? is there any one aspect which will embrace
its various movements ? Perhaps only this : a de
termined assertion of the rights of the individual as
against all authority. Authoritative assertion it will
have none of: whether it be the authority of the Church,
or the authority of Thought in its universal relations,
or the authority of a great Matter outside which forces
knowledge into conformity with itself. If ever any of
these assertions of Authority are made, in however tenta
tive a form, they are immediately destroyed. Scholasti
cism made the assertion of the Church s Authority
: and
Bacon and Descartes threw it off. Locke tended to
assert the Authority of Matter, and Berkeley threw it
off. Berkeley tended to assert the Authority of Spirit
or Universal Thought, and Hume threw it off. The
right of the individual to construct his own world of
Knowledge and Thought and Life, this is perhaps the
one dominant feature of the whole period.
When, after such a general prospect, we look closer
into these systems, the action and reaction, the con
struction and the destruction, the synthesis and the4 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
analysis strike us more clearly. Philosophy means
Invention, says Bacon : Philosophy means the assertion
of myself as a thinking subject, says Descartes. Then
follow Materialism in Hobbes, Pantheism in Spinoza,
Sensationalism in Locke, Idealism in Berkeley, Scepti
cism in Hume, Monadism or Individualistic Idealism in
Leibnitz, endless analysis in Wolff. The mere terms
of description are so antagonistic that the whole period
looks like chaos. Bat this makes still clearer the
business of the historian, to disentangle the permanent
elements from the transitory, to discover the progres
sive tendencies, and dissever them from the retrogres
sive, to let the various systems fall into their proper
places of superiority and subordination, to discover
which for us are the most important and which
most helpful to Thought and Philosophy viewed
as a Progress, and not as a chaos of conflicting
opinions.
There are two points which are chiefly interesting
in studying any period. The first is to see the limita
tions of Thought to see how Thought, as expressed in
the various systems, is limited to one issue rather than
another, to the one-sided affirmation of one tendency
and the undue depreciation of another tendency.
And the second is to see the Development of Thought
to deny which is indeed the deathblow of Philosophy,
the end of all fruitful relation between Philosophy and
Life.INTEODUCTOEY. 5
Let us look at the first of these.
Thought, we say, is limited in its expression in any
one system. Limited by what? By three things
by the particular character of the knowledge around
it, by nationality, by the particular moment at which
the system is born.
In Bacon, for instance, there is the enormous and rapid
development of physical research going on around him :
there is
&quot; the moment
&quot; wherein the individual thinker
was casting off the restraints of authority, whether of
Church or of Aristotle : and as to the problem which he
assigned to Philosophy, the problem of Invention, or
Human Mastery over Nature s secrets, who can doubt
that such a problem essentially suited the character of
a grave, practical, active people like the English, with
their spirit of enterprise as exhibited in travel, and
their intolerance for metaphysics and word-splitting ?
These, in the sphere of literature, we call
li
predis
posing causes,&quot; because in literature the diversity




in the case of Thought, limita
tions of that pure, distinctionless spirit, the inmost
nature of which must be to be above party or creed
or nation.
Or if, leaving Bacon, we look at the course of philo
sophy as it expressed itself in Locke, and was then
extended by Berkeley and Hume, similar results are
obtained. We see in Locke the incarnation of the6 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
English philosophic temper, the massive common-
sense, the semi-materialism, the practical way of
&quot;
sending a man back to his senses.&quot; But after Locke,
tendencies a little alien to the English mind come
in, Berkeley, the too vivacious and spiritual Irish
man, attempting to prove that Locke s philosophy led
to Idealism, and Hume, the too logical and hard-
headed Scotchman, shocking English respectability,
by showing that Locke led straight to Scepticism.
I have taken the British philosophers, because it is
more easy for us to see in their case these limitations
in the expression of Thought; but the same thing
would of course be true, among others, of Spinoza
and Wolff. Spinoza, the Jew, filled full with the
Jewish idea of God s unity and omnipotence, naturally
turned his thought into a system of Pantheism ; and
Wolff, the German, with his patient analysis, with his
spider-like propensity of evolving thought out of him
self, with his method, his completeness, his dulness
are not these characteristics of his nationality ?
All these considerations add, I think, to the fresh
ness of interest in studying the History of Philosophy,
but they might lead us to serious error. The effect is
to make one believe too much in individualities and
too little in Thought. Philosophy is too sacred and
too impersonal a thing to be resolved into mere con
ditions and limitations of epochs or nationalities or
individual tempers. Let us then try to correct thisINTEODUCTOEY. 7
by turning to the other point of interest, the Develop
ment of Thought. In the vast and multiform move
ment of thought during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, what elements of permanent acquisition in
Philosophy were being brought to light? What
threads may we disentangle from the complex web to
give the clue to the new pattern ?
The first I will instance is the meaning and proper
content of the word
&quot;
Individual.&quot; That looks an in
significant result assuredly. But it is not so really ;
it carries with it far weightier consequences than would
appear at first sight. What, in the first place, is an
Individual object ? We apprehend many such every
day of our lives, and without analysis we should say
that an individual object of perception was the effect
or result of a single unrelated moment of conscious
ness, taking in or grasping a single unrelated thing.
That is, in truth, the way it strikes Locke ; he is, as a
philosopher, exactly in the same position as we are in
our unanalytic common-sense moods. But then it is
from these objects, successively apprehended, that our
whole body of knowledge, in some way, grows ; and
again it is of these objects, single and unrelated, that
in some way the world, as a whole, is composed. Now,
if we put a number of leaden bullets together, they
certainly do not mass themselves into one large leaden
bullet by themselves. That is only possible if they
are fused together by melting. And a number of8 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
single, unrelated objects will never form an articulated
world, or a complex bod}^ of knowledge, unless they
too are in some way fused together. How are they to
be fused? The obvious reply is, that the mind invents
some links or relations between them. Are these
links, then, formed by the mind, purely fictitious,
mere inventions ? Yes, answer Locke and Hume, they
are not found in the constitution of things. Then
the world, as a totality, and not as a mere heap of
objects, is a delusion ? Yes. And knowledge, as a
synthesis, and as a unity, and not as a succession of
single modes of consciousness, is a delusion also ?
Yes. Here then we have the complete scepticism
of Hume. But Philosophy and Knowledge refuse
to commit suicide in this way. And so, as the whole
conclusion seems to come from the way in which the
individual was regarded, Philosophy looks at this
&quot; individual
&quot;
again, to see if it can be defined
differently. There are three words : particular, indi
vidual, universal, which seem to come in a definite
order. Of these, it is particular
&quot; which should
properly be applied to the single, unrelated impression,
just as it is &quot;universal,&quot; which is obviously applied
to the synthesis of objects in a world, or a synthesis
of perception in knowledge. What then is indi
vidual ? It is the meeting-point of particular and
universal. In an individual object, how much, if we
carefully analyse, is involved ? This much, there isINTRODUCTORY. 9
the particular impression on the sentient organs, and
;
)
there is the action of the mind, which grasps this im- ;
pression, and retains it, by relating it to other iin-
i
pressions
: and so the object becomes definite and v
individual, distinguished from everything else, and I
yet related to everything else. Another result, too,
follows. If the universal element, i.e., the super-
induction of relations, really makes a world, and not
a mere heap of unrelated objects, it must be due to
Thought, that we get a real world at all ; or, in other
words, Reality is the work of Thought, to be found in
thought, and not in a supposed Matter, still less in a
series of sensations.
Let us, before leaving this word,
&quot;
universal,&quot; look
at it in another way. Take an individual man, a finite
individual. Is there such a creature ? Spinoza says,
No. He is only an unreal fraction of the Universal.
Hume would say Yes, the universal, on the contrary,
being a mere fiction of the finite individual. Here are
the two extremes, and here is the difficulty. An indi
vidual man is finite and separate, on the one hand, and
yet on the other he can arrive at universal notions
and have an idea of Universality whether exhibited in
a Perfect God, or a Cosmic Unity. How is this pos
sible ? Only, as it seems, in one way
: The individual
is a junction of the Universal and the Particular,
limited as being
&quot; a part of this partial world
&quot; of
* Green s &quot;Hume,&quot; p. 131.10 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
matter, as we roughly call it ; but transcending his
limitations, as being self-conscious, because Thought
is universal.
Such are the momentous issues of a proper appre
ciation of this word, so simple as it seems,
&quot; Indi
vidual.&quot;
Again, we can trace the same progress in the
proper understanding of such words as Sensation,
Perception, Thought. Sensation and Perception are
treated as identical, not distinguished, both by Locke
and Hume : we cannot say exactly the same of
Berkeley, because he seemed to recognise in the second
edition of his
&quot;
Principles,&quot; that he would have to
distinguish his
&quot;
idea,&quot; or passive sensation, from an
active something, which he called
&quot;
notion.&quot;
i In reality it appears that Sensation, Perception,
I and Thought are the correlates of the words, Par-
picular, Individual, Universal. We do not appre
hend an Individual by Sensation, as Locke thought.
All we can be aware of by Sensation is a single
moment of sentience a momentary modification of
our sensibility, which is what we call
&quot; Parti-
,cular.&quot; An individual object, however, is perceived:
a perception, in other words, is the superinduction
on the particular element of sensation, of the uni
versal element of . Thought-relations. To constitute
an individual object, the momentary sensation has
to be arrested, fixed, made definite, crystallized, byINTEODUCTOEY. 11
the putting on of relations, which serve to dis-
tinguish it from, and relate it to, everything else.
This is Perception the fusion, as it were, of the uni
versal element of Thought and the particular elements
;
of Sensation.
The inquiry naturally comes after all this, is not
this mere elaborate word-splitting? Does it, after all,
make much difference what particular meaning we
assign to words of this sort ? It makes no difference,
it may at once be admitted, to the practical, common-
sense man, who wishes to carve out his fortune in his
own practical way any more than it makes any
difference to the Scientific man, who wipes away all
these mental cobwebs, and applies himself to experi
ment and the acquisition of knowledge of Nature. The
only thing to be remembered is, that underlying all
these experiments and all- this practical acquaintance
with the world, there is the further question, which
some minds are compelled to ask, How is Nature,
How is the world, known at all? And then the
result comes out, that, despite all this seemingly
immediate perception of Nature and the world, the
underlying fact is
&quot;
consciousness,&quot; and the appa-
rently external thing is found by an inexorable logic,
to be after all a mode of consciousness. Something
of course there is of external, something which is,
as it were, given to the mind and not manufactured
by the mind, but the whole envisagement of the thing,12 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
the whole
&amp;lt;
entourage/ as it were, which makes it for us
a thing at all, is the creation of consciousness.
All this preliminary consideration, the whole of these
fundamental conditions, may be taken for granted, but
cannot be denied. And the interest for the meta
physical philosopher is just this preliminary considera
tion, these fundamental conditions, the satisfactory
explanation of which means for him progress, and
their systematic neglect, or confused treatment, means
for him the demolition of all raison d etre whatsoever.
And so all these strands of inquiry and speculation,
some of which we have been considering, are reduced
at length to the one great decisive problem What is
the relation of the Self to the Not- Self, of the Ego to
the Non-Ego ? To deny the Self, means scepticism
and despair of knowledge as a reasoned system, as it
did with Hume. To deny the Not- Self, means end
less analysis and sterile revolution of thought upon
itself, as it did with Wolff. Progressive advance of
knowledge, and knowledge as a reasoned system, alike
imperatively demand the acknowledgment of both
factors, and some necessary relation between the two.
What, then, is the relation ?
All the speculation of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries seems to tend to one result, which may
thus be summed. The Not-Self is the manifold,
the unformed, the antipov, as it successively comes in
upon our sentient organs. A sensation is thisINTRODUCTOKY. 13
momentary stirring of the sensory organs
: a Percep-
tion is the individualising, the making-definite of the
manifold of sensation by the relations imposed by
Thought. Thought is two-fold : in relation to Percep
tion, it is the superinduction of forms, of categories
:
in relation to itself, it is the universal, which makes
these forms, these categories, the creator of a Real
World, as a totality or synthesis of Phenomena, the
creator of Knowledge, as a synthesis or totality of Per
ception, a perfect and complete Self-Consciousness
limited, indeed, in the case of men, by their being
finite parts of this finite order, while in God, it is
just this Divine Self-Consciousness, apart from and
above all such limitations.
Not- Self, Self, God TO a-eipor, TO
TreTre/xifrjueVoz;,
TO Trepay
: these are the successive moments of Meta
physics, and it is in progress to and in realisation of
these, that it finds its scope, its justification, and its
life.
What the position of Mill is, with regard to this
vast intellectual movement, we have now to attempt to
discover. For the present, we may just indicate the
conditions under which his philosophy is attempted.
He is a Sensationalist, that is, he belongs to that
line of English philosophy which commenced with14 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
Hobbes, was continued by Locke and Berkeley, and
culminated in Hume. But, if our review of the
period be at all correct, Hume represented the high-
water mark of this sort of speculation. Therefore Mill
must combine with Hume some newer elements.
Above all, living in a great scientific age, he must
make his peace with Science, which Hume, to say the
least, somewhat gravely affronted. And Science, for
most thinkers, has only one metaphysical foundation,
viz., that of Realism. Therefore Mill has in some way
-to combine Sensationalism and Realism. He is a
Sensationalist in his
&quot; Examination of Sir W. Hamil
ton,&quot; and a Realist in his
&quot;
Logic.&quot;
Or let ns look at him from a different aspect. He is
an Empiricist, one link in that chain of empirical
research which was formulated in the eighteenth cen
tury and vastly developed in the nineteenth. But
empiricism in the hands of Locke and Hume is indi
vidualistic ; empiricism in the hands of Herbert
Spencer and George Henry Lewes is universalistic.
To which of the two species of empiricism does Mill




plays so large a part in his philosophy, belongs to the
age which preceded him, not to that of his contenipo-
I
raries. In other words, not in an age of individualism,
; he founds his philosophy on the experience of the
1 individual, like Hume, not on that of the race, like
Herbert Spencer. Living in the nineteenth century,INTKODUCTOKY. 15




development of the race
&quot;
are in the air, he still
turns back to the time when
&quot; the historic sense
&quot;
was hardly born.CHAPTEK II.
THE ANTECEDENTS OF MILL. HUME.
THE spiritual progenitor of Mill is undoubtedly
Hume. Without Hume, Mill would not have been
possible, just as without Locke and Berkeley, Hume
would not have been possible. Yet the relation of
Mill and his predecessor is by no means the same as
that of Hume and his predecessors. There are times
when thought enters almost without warning upon
a brilliant and rapidly-developing course, when every
step forward presents a clearly-defined and continuous
progress,
&quot;
churning life out of a dead level of habit and
custom,&quot; striking out glints and gleams of meteoric
brilliance, till the whole intellectual horizon is glowing
with their fires. Such was the brief life of drama in
England, or the sudden glory of Athenian art : such
too, with more sombre and subdued radiance, was the
development of Sensationalism in England from Locke
to Hume. In these times, the lineal successor is also
the more perfect mouthpiece of the thought ; each step
brings out the system into sharper and bolder relief.THE ANTECEDENTS OF MILL. I1UME. 17
But in other times, when the animating impulse has
subsided, and the Spirit has spent its force, lineal
succession becomes mere repetition with variations,
dying away into hollower, artificial, capricious echoes.
And then the thinker who takes up the mantle that
has dropped from his predecessor s shoulders, is merely
sewing pieces of new cloth into the old raiment,
whereby the rents are made worse.
The peculiar merit of Hume, as a philosopher, con
sists in his superior consistency. With him, the doc
trines of Sensationalism which he inherited, are cleared
of their inconsistencies and presented in clear and
startling nakedness. In many respects, his is an
almost ideal character for a philosopher. There is his
absolute freedom from Theological prepossession, which
enabled him to discuss, without any anxiety about the
issue, the successive difficulties of Philosophy, and
accept with composure the sceptical conclusion. There
is the literary vanity the last infirmity of philosophic
minds which led him to suppress his earlier work, and
suggested brilliant paradox arid intolerant posturing
against Dogmatists and Mystics ; and there is the
literary strategy and skill which taught him how to
arrange his arguments to win his reader s ears. Perhaps,
too, must be added the characteristic frankness with
which he confessed that his doubts left him, as soon as
he left his study* the unconscious testimony to the dis-
* &quot;
Treatise,&quot; Bk. IV., sec. vii.15 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
satisfaction which is the natural issue of such a system,
and to the obdurate refusal of knowledge to commit such
suicide, as Hume recommended. These merits enabled
him to see more clearly than ever was seen before the
real problem which he had to solve. The problem
forced upon him by preceding thought was this : given
the mind as
&quot; a tabula
rasa,&quot; a passive receptacle of ex
perience, to explain the progress of knowledge. Locke
was inclined to fall back on an exterior matter, to be
the cause of our sensations and the progressive source
of experience. But if all that we can be sure of is
sensation, abstract unperceivable Matter is of course
an impossible conception. Berkeley was inclined to
fall back on Spirit and God, as the fountain-head of
knowledge ; but the same line of argument, which dis
posed of Matter apart from a series of sensations, was
equally fatal to Mind, or God, apart from a series of
sensations. And so the cherished illusions of his pre
decessors whether Locke s real primary qualities of a





dissolved in the glowing crucible of Hume s logic.
The conclusion stands forth in naked clearness that
all we can be sure of in consciousness, is just the sen
sations experienced, and the copies of them in so-called
ideas. Such is the
&quot;
pars destruens
&quot; of Hume s work.
Let us now remind ourselves, constructively, of the main
positions of his system.
1 . All knowledge is resolved into sensuous impres-THE ANTECEDENTS OF MILL. HUME. 10
sions and ideas the ideas being tl^e copies of the
impressions. If then we wish to find the reality of
any idea that we have in our minds, we must find the
sensuous impression of which it is the copy. In this
Hume shows himself a true disciple of the school of
Locke.
A double limitation of knowledge is thus introduced.
In the first place, knowledge cannot be, in any true
sense, objective
: for as to the original of the sensuous
impression we can say nothing. We cannot speak of a
Matter, or a Material World, impressing our sense-
organs, for this is to travel beyond our record. We
are strictly limited to our own perceptions and feelings.
In the second place, knowledge cannot be, in any true
sense, subjective, that is, we cannot put any faith in the
constructive power of the mind. For an idea is only so
far valid as it is the copy of a sensuous impression.
Thus the mind is strictly receptive working up, with
more or less advantage, the materials of sense-im
pression, in accordance with certain associative prin
ciples. So ruthlessly does Hume sweep away Physics
and Metaphysics.
2. What are these associative principles ? They are
three in number: Resemblance, Contiguity in Time
and Place, and Causation. The mind is inclined to
class together ideas or impressions, which resemble
each other, or which occur in close juxtaposition, or20 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
which follow each other so as to lead us to infer that
one is the cause of the other.
It is the last of these of which we obviously make most
use in constructing our knowledge of the world in
which we live : it is the principle of Causality, there
fore, which seems to be most objectively real, and it is
to this that Hume s attention is most directed.
3. Knowledge, in the opinion of Hume, may be
either analytic or synthetic
: in other words, we may
either get to a clearer comprehension of our own ideas,
or attain to fresh additions to our knowledge. Geo
metrical axioms are instances of analytical knowledge.
When we say that two straight lines cannot inclose
a space, we are merely analysing what we mean by a
straight line, the predicate of the proposition affirming
explicitly what was implicit in the subject. Moreover,
here we get to a connection which is a necessary one,
because we are only moving amongst our own ideas.
The contradictory of an analytic proposition (such as
the principle that &quot;everything is either A or not
A,&quot;
or the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two
right angles), is impossible and absurd. Here then
is a
&quot;
necessity,&quot; but merely because we are concerned
with the agreement or disagreement of our ideas.
The question is whether synthetic propositions, (pro
positions which add something to our knowledge,) can
ever be necessary. Now reasoning on matters of fact
depends principally on the relation of Cause and Effect.THE ANTECEDENTS OF MILL. HUME. 21
Have we here a necessary connection or not ? If it is a
necessary connection, the contradictory of an assertion
of such relation is absurd and unintelligible. But the
assertion that day is not followed by night is certainly not
unintelligible. Further, if it is a connection which we
attain to a priori, we ought, by a mere analysis of the
cause, to be able to arrive at the effect. Let us analyse,
then,
&quot;
fire.&quot; Can we, by mere analysis, arrive at the
knowledge that it gives light ? Or, by the analysis of
one billiard-ball, can we arrive at the conclusion that, if
propelled against another, it will make that other move ?
4. The principle of Causality, then, is not a necessary
connection, nor is it an a priori law of our minds. Of
what, then, is it a product? Simply of experience.
Experience tells us that one thing is followed by
another. Further than this we may not go.
5. But by what right, then, do we, as a matter of
fact, on the occurrence of one sense-impression, infer
that it will be followed by another ? We evidently do
this, as our every-day experience testifies. What is the
justification of this inference ? Habit, Custom, answers
Hume. We have had many experiences ; many ex
periences produce a certain feeling of expectancy
: this
is the product of Custom. Hence, on the occurrence of
one thing, we infer that it will be followed by another,
because we are accustomed or habituated to their con
junction. The notion of a hidden tie, linking together
cause and effect, or the idea of Power, is explained as22 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
being nothing else but an expectation grounded on
custom.
&quot;
Power&quot; could on]y be a valid idea, if we
could find its original, i.e., the sensuous impression of
which it is a copy. Can we find such a sensuous
impression ? We cannot, either in the world outside





the world within us for all that we are conscious of
within us is a flux of sensations and ideas : and neither
in the so-called power of the soul over the body, or the
power of the Will, is there anything like it. So the
&quot; hidden
tie,&quot; between cause and effect, and the
&quot;power




tion,&quot; is merely habitual or customary association.
We need not pursue Hume s philosophy any further.
We have seen that it rests on the characteristic
grounds of empirical Philosophy grounds which allow
of no active or originative power to the mind, and
which trace back all human knowledge to sense-im
pressions. Thus to Hume, the only possible sources
of mental possession are &quot;impressions of sense&quot; and
&quot;
impressions of reflection,&quot; or, in other words, sensa
tions and emotions. From these arise in a fainter
form ideas, ideas, which may be on the one hand, the
direct heritage of decaying sensations, or, on the other,
the product of emotional states, such as
&quot;
desire,&quot; orTHE ANTECEDENTS OF MILL. HUME. 23
With this groundwork Hume makes short work of
Locke s external matter, and Berkeley s objective and
subjective Spirit. In examining his philosophy, we are
therefore freed from all necessity of showing how little
the world, as a totality of phenomena, or Self-Con
sciousness, as a totality of feelings and ideas, or God,
as the Absolute and Divine Self-Consciousness, can be
constructed on such a narrow foundation. We have v
already seen that Hume, pushing Locke to his logical
conclusions, did away with the Primary Qualities of
Matter, and Cause, as an objective relation, and per
forming the same service to Berkeley, showed the
non-existence of a Self, and a God.
What difficult problems then remain, which Hume s
philosophy of negation or scepticism has to solve ?
What of the higher questions of Logic and Meta
physics urgently require to be dealt with and cleared
up, if the sensationalist or empirical foundation of
philosophy is to be accepted ?
Sensationalism, not being absolute Pyrrhonism, (or
absolute denial of the possibility of knowledge,) has
at least to find room for the exact sciences, and the
physical sciences. Now Mathematics, broadly speak
ing, depend on certain ultimate ideas ; Number
, Quan
tity, Space, Time; and Physics depend, in their turn,
on certain ultimate ideas, such as the Uniformity of
Nature, the conception of Cause and Effect. Further,
the possibility of these ultimate ideas is found itself to24 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
depend on prior mental conditions, e.g., The Faculty
of Abstraction (the formation of general ideas), and the
power of Association of Ideas, which, in their ultimate
expression, amount to the power of forming Mental
Relations, distinct from and above the changing im
pressions of sense.
It may easily be gathered that Hume s treatment of
these problems was not wholly satisfactory, and that
the burden he left to posterity was the re-consideration
and re-construction of our notions on these points.
Of this Mill himself is not unconscious, though his
I
relation to these questions is peculiar. Mathematics
and Physics these must be saved at all hazards ;
these must be placed on a foundation, safe from the
critical scepticism of Hume. And so it is exactly
on these points on the question of the foundations
of Mathematics, and the question of Causation and
Natural Uniformity that Mill differs from his
predecessor. But the groundwork is left by Mill un
disturbed. Sensationalism and Empiricism are still
the dogmatic foundations of his creed. He saw that
Hume s treatment of Science and Mathematics was
not eminently satisfactory, and so, as we shall here
after see, he tried to re-mould it. He did not see
that that treatment followed with rigid consistency
from the essential groundwork of the Empirical and
Sensational structure, which would itself retaliate
on his
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matical Necessity, and the definition of Cause are
very differently stated in Mill and Hume : but the
real dependence of these on the prior condition of
Mental relations, and the impossibility of any recon
struction of them, unless the notion of Mental action
was first re-constructed to this Mill is characteristi
cally blind. This is just that lateral oscillation of
which any system is capable in the hands of a disciple.
Widen the edifice, but leave the foundation as it is
this is the procedure of Mill, a procedure which is not
and cannot be an improvement, but far more probably
the cause of future disaster and downfall.
Hume describes himself as
&quot; a moderate sceptic.&quot;*
He is right. For there is one thing which he assumes
and takes for granted, as an ultimate fact, the validity
of which is left to depend on itself. This is
&quot;
Experience.&quot; For if experience be explained by
causality, and causality be explained by custom, and
custom be explained by experience, we move in a
vicious circle, and do not advance one jot in our
explanation. Experience is presupposed in the ac
count of experience
: experience is explained by expe
rience. So Hume is not a true sceptic, or rather let
us say that he is not a true critical philosopher. For
a critical philosophy must not take experience for
granted, but must seek to explain it. This Kant saw.
The line of development of Philosophic Thought runs
* &quot;
Enquiry,&quot; xii., 3.25 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
through Locke and Berkeley and Hume, but Mill is
not the successor thereof. The real inheritor of Hume s
philosophy, the real disciple, the next great
&quot; moment&quot;
in the Intellectual advance is not Mill, but Kant.CHAPTER III.
THE ANTECEDENTS OF MILL (continued).
EIGHTY or ninety years elapsed between Hume s
capita] work and Mill s. Hume died in 1776. The
years of Mill s life fall between 18061873. The
question, then, naturally suggests itself, what phases
of philosophic thought successively appeared in the
interval ? What systems arose, which presenting and
enforcing new points of view, could not help leaving
their traces on any thinker of the latter half of the
nineteenth century ? Such is our present problem.
It was natural that Hume s sceptical tenets should
produce an immediate reaction. It was equally natural
that the reaction should take two forms, one of which
should be the normal rebound against an extreme
tension of thought, the other the truer development
and expansion by means of criticism and a sounder
analysis. The first was to be found in Hume s native
country, the second in Germany. The form which the
English reaction took in the hands of Reid, Dugald
Stewart and Brown, in reality showed a want of28 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
philosophic grasp and insight. For, instead of boldly
attaching themselves to the analysis of experience
(of which Hume made such capital), instead of
attempting to see what elements were involved in the
phenomena of sensation, perception, and the formation
of conceptions, and so arriving at a truer interpretation
of the meaning of
&quot;
experience,&quot; the immediate
antagonists of Hume fell back upon the verdict of
Common Sense, and the somewhat crude notions of
what is called
&quot;
Realism.&quot; A beneficial result, which
was perhaps a fortuitous consequence of the
&quot; Common
Sense stand-point, was the beginning of an inde
pendent investigation of psychology, destined to bear
greater fruit, when it came into the hands of James
Mill and those whom he influenced. According to the
views of this reactionary Scotch school, we are imme
diately conscious of external objects and an external
world.
The Scotch school were not unfruitful in the History
of Philosophy. In France, a school that mingled, in
about equal proportions, fragments of Cartesian
thought, a nebulous spiritualism and an unedifying
eclecticism, carried on the crusade against the spirit of
the age, which had been taught to Eoyer-Collard by
Eeid. As the Common-Sense School had a horror of
Hume, so the French Eclectics had a horror of Con-
dillac and Diderot. Just as Reid and Brown re
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the feverish rhetoric of Victor Cousin, lurked a nervous
dread of the Revolutionary spirit.
So far, then, we find a reaction against Hume and
Sensationalism, animated, indeed, by the best of
motives, but deficient in such metaphysical ability
and insight, as are necessary to meet the acute specu
lations of men like Hume and the Encyclopaedists.
If the results of philosophical analysis were such a
melancholy reversal of current notions and ordinary
beliefs, it were better, in the opinion of the reactionists,
to give up analysis, and fall back on the broad uncritical
methods of the common consciousness. If ordinary
men of the world found, notwithstanding the scepticism
of Hume, that their wonted views of the world outside
them, and the soul inside them, were satisfactory, the
fault must lie with the philosopher, and not with their
views. Perish philosophical analysis, if its result be
scepticism
! Such a reaction as this is not singular in
the History of Thought, but it has had, and can have
but one issue. Analysis can only be conquered by a
more perfect analysis
: philosophy can only succumb
to a truer philosophy. Uncritical oratory only dis
guises tile wounds, which it cannot heal. Rhetoric
is oftener the privilege of weakness, than the conscious
overflow of power.
The true development of Hume s thoughts came





Hume, Kant, and after him Fichte, Schelling, and30 THE METAPHYSICS OP MILL.
Hegel, have not only materially altered the conditions
of all philosophic thought and inquiry, but have
perhaps made more positive contributions to Meta
physical Science than have been made in any one
period since the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.
It is impossible to characterise the work of Kant by
-a single expression. Coming after Hume and the
English school with its two characteristics of Indi
vidualism and Sensationalism, Kant saw that the
whole ground-work of Human Knowledge must be
gone over anew. Nothing short of a revolution in
mode and method, it was his claim to have inaugurated.
&quot;Critical&quot; is the title given to his philosophy, and
critical is throughout its character. For it set itself to
analyse the antecedent conditions of experience, the
conditions which render that very experience, which was
clung to with such fervour by the English school, pos
sible at all. And soKant s positive result is the discovery
that in the whole process of knowledge, from the earliest
beginnings of Sensation, there is an interaction of two
factors, one of which is supplied by the mind in the so-
called &quot;forms,&quot; the other supplied by an external
element, of which all we can say is, that it is not_
mental. Critical again the Kantian philosophy is, in
the affirmation that we can only deal with phenomena,
not with noiimena, that what Mind and Spirit are in
themselves we cannot say, any more than we can say
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the component result of two factors, one objective, the
other subjective.
Idealism in one form or other is the character
of the philosophy that succeeded Kant : but it is
idealism in different phases, and conceived in dif
ferent ways. Fichte s philosophy, if summed up in a
word, is Subjective Idealism, Schilling s is Objective
Idealism, Hegel s is Absolute Idealism. This is all
the development and carrying out of that one side of
the Kantian philosophy which showed itself in the
mental forms, a priori conceptions, and categories.
Another school of German thought attempted to
develope the objective side, but with them we are not
concerned.
Two other phases of thought appeared in the in
terval between Hume and Mill, which we must briefly
notice. The first of these was inaugurated by Comte
and Positivism. Positivism is at once a system
of thought, and a system of life, and has contributed
alike to logical and social science. With the form of
socialism, which is connected with Positivism, we have
got nothing to do. But the chief features of Posi
tivism, as a philosophy, are the suppression of all
researches beyond phenomena&quot;, the affirmation of a
great historic law of Progress, and a classification of
the Sciences.
Lastly, we must notice an English Psychological
School (generally connected with Utilitarianism in32 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
Morals) which immediately preceded and was con
temporary with Mill. It commenced with Hartley,
was taken up by James Mill, and carried on by
Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, and Herbert Spencer.
The chief characteristic of this Psychological School is
the stress it lays upon the principle of Association of
Ideas, which is its key to the explanation of all mental
phenomena.
Here
thei&amp;gt; we have five schools-^the Common Sense
School, the French Eclectics, the German Metaphy
sicians, the Positivists, and the English Psychologists,
whose influence on Mill we have now to attempt to
discover. It will be better, at whatever penalty of
methodical dulness, to take each of these in order.
One of them we may at once begin by dismissing.
The tendencies of the French Eclectics are utterly
alien to that scientific spirit, which is the best element
of Mill. They emphasized just those features in their
predecessors, which are least connected with the
scientific spirit. For the French school of Royer-
Collard and others is animated by two principles,
Eclecticism and Spiritualism, and Mill is as far from
the first as he is from the last.
The influence, however, of the Common Sense
School upon Mill is real, though, being indirect, it is
by no means easy to define. That system which
regards Nature as the exhibition of laws, which33
are invariable, and which combine to form what
we call the
&quot; Uniformity of Nature,&quot; which holds,
farther, that these laws and uniformities are attainable
by the human intellect, while yet it strenuously denies
that they are realities, because formed by thought and
because in and through them Consciousness is intel
ligibly constructing the impressions given by the
gense8__that system, I say, depends for its meta
physical foundation on the doctrines of Realism. And
so far as Mill adopts these uniformities of Nature
without regarding them as the product of Thought,
and conceives that in perception and knowledge we
are immediately in contact with a world outside us,
(whence it results that Induction and the four Ex
perimental Methods are valid and trustworthy,) so far
Mill is at one with that spirit of Realism, which is
the animating impulse of the Common Sense School.
But, fortunately or unfortunately, Mill s metaphysical
foundations, when he discloses them, are not those of
Realism. He would call them
&quot;
Psychological ;&quot; we I
may perhaps be allowed to call them
&quot;
Idealistic.&quot; /!
The so-called Psychological Theory of Matter insists,
in the strongest manner, upon the Relativity of our
knowledge of the External World; in other words, that
Consciousness cannot transcend itself, and that we are
and can be only conscious of our own subjective inter
pretation of things, and not conscious of things in
themselves. The conclusion follows with Mill that we34 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
C^annot
apprehend Matter and Objective Reality imme-
liately, but ^aediatej^. And further, we cannot appre
hend Spirit and Subjective Reality immediately but
mediately. In these conclusions, then, Mill is in
antagonism to the School of Common Sense. That
school would say that the World outside us and the
Soul inside us are matters of direct presentation.
Mill holds that they are matters of indirect pre
sentation. And_s_0jjwhile allowing, or at least seeming
to allow, the scientific conclusions of the Realistic spirit
of the Common Sense School, he denies their meta
physical foundation. The influence, in fact, of this
school upon Mill is filtered through channels of Brown
and Hamilton, and while Brown is, in many respects,
by Mill admired and imitated, Hamilton, as the
compound of Kant and the Common Sense School, is
ruthlessly attacked.
The next school alluded to was formed by the
metaphysical systems of Germany. In relation to
these it is one of the singular characteristics of
Mill that he knows or cares very little about them.
He is for ever under the impression that the whole
German world is groaning and travailing in the
chains of a false metaphysical method : while it is
plain to every modern historian of philosophy that
Germany is at present leading the whole world
even in empirical research. More than this. He
makes a startling remark about Kant. The only part,lie thinks, of Hume s doctrine about Causality, which
&quot;his great adversary Kant&quot; contested, was that Cause
meant
&quot; the invariable antecedent.&quot; Now surely, as a
matter of fact, the result of Hume s analysis of Cause
was to show that, as it rested upon mere custom, it was
variable, or at all events, not objectively invariable :
while the result of Kant s analysis was above all this
that Causation was necessary and invariable as
bein^cTe~pendent on a mental Category, which made
it real (for Eeality was the work of Thought) and
objectively valid.*
The truth is that Mill, in Idealism, never got beyond
such Idealism as is to be found in Berkeley, which is
not in reality Idealism at all, or, at most, is subjective
Idealism. More accurately, it would be called Sensa
tionalism, qualified by foregone Theological conclu
sions. It is Sensationalism, so far as the human
Consciousness is considered as a merely sentient con
sciousness, and not a thinking one. It is Idealism, so
far as, the analysis being imperfect, Thought, Spirit,
Soul, God are instinctively, though not logically,
retained.
But Idealism, such as Berkeley s, would never lead
Mill to the understanding of Kant, much less of
Hegel. He is quite indignant with the German meta
physicians on this ground that they made mere con-
Cf. Dr. Stirling, Supplementary Notes to Schwegler s History
of Philosophy, p. 455.
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ceptions of mind take the place of things. He is
in such a hurry to establish this, that he never stops
to think whether his own doctrines (as exhibited, e.g.,
in the Psychological Theories of Matter and Mind)





more than the construction of mind. Assumptions
of noumena he cannot away with ; yet he too, when
pressed, has to admit that things in themselves may
exist, though we do not know exactly what they are,
because we only know them through their sensations
the very doctrine of Kant.
We shall perhaps better understand the position of
Mill when we understand his great obligations and his
consequent adherence to the English Psychological
School, which immediately preceded him. That school
really began with Hartley. The characteristic doctrine
of Hartley was his theory of
&quot; vibrations
&quot; the doc
trine, namely, that all nervous actions, as well as the
phenomena of light, heat, and electricity, consist of
vibrations, an hypothesis by which he further explained
the processes of sensation. But the doctrine which
most influenced his successors, was that insistence on
{the Law of Mental Association, which made Mill call
him &quot;the First Father of Association.&quot; It was in
this that his influence upon Mill was most decided.
James Mill carried out and elaborated the doctrine
of Association which he had derived from Hartley,
and which has been completed not only by Mill, butmuch more by Bain and Herbert Spencer. The im
perfections of Mr. James Mill have been so well stated
by his son in his Preface to the
&quot;
Analysis of the
Phenomena of the Human Mind,&quot;* that I may repro
duce two of them here.
&quot;
First, the imperfection of
physiological science at the time at which his book was
written. Secondly, a certain impatience of detail and
a consequent love of simplification which cannot always
be trusted.&quot; For instance, the laws of Association of
Ideas are reduced to the one principle of contiguity in
space and time, (whereas even Hume allowed, as we
have seen, of three,) a simplification which Stuart Mill
says is
&quot;
perhaps the least successful in the work.&quot; f
The tendency towards physiology and the stress laid
on Mental Association, as the source and origin of all
Mental Ideas, are the two elements which Mill prin
cipally derived from his father and from Hartley, and
both will explain his expressed abhorrence of meta
physics. With regard to the first, however, there is
this much to be said, that the early disciples of the
Association School James Mill and, to a large extent,
Stuart Mill did not connect their speculations with
biology in the same explicit way in which the later
advocates of the doctrine do. The dependence of our
moral and spiritual nature on our physical nature is
the result of the later English psychologists, Bain,
Spencer, and George Henry Lewes.
* Vol. i. p. xv. to p. xx. f Ibid, note 35.38 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
We turn finally to the Positive School and Comte,
and we have to ask how far Mill is indebted to that
system which Comte inaugurated. The relation of
Mill to Positivism is by no means so easy to discuss
as the relations we have already examined, nor is it
easy to give very decided opinions on the point. A
good many of the opponents of Mill have a tendency
to merge him in the wider doctrines of Positivism : on
the other hand, Mill himself seems inclined to repu
diate the connection, and in his book &quot;Auguste Comte
and Positivism
&quot;
delivers some trenchant criticisms on
this particular School.
The Positive System is the product we find at once
of the positive sciences, and of Saint-Simonism, a com
bination of empiricism and socialism. The latter
element we have agreed to drop out of the considera
tion ; and, indeed, some of the speculations of M. Comte
on this point have been repudiated by his best modern
followers M. Littre and others.
Further, there are two sides to Positivism. There is
the destructive side, wherein we find the search for final
causes and first causes is distinctly abandoned. With
the beginning and end of things we have nothing to do,
we are only concerned with what lies between these
two extremes. Thus all forms of theology, all forms of
metaphysics, are practically discarded.
Now, so far as this point is concerned, it is un
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standpoint must be ascribed to Mill. He too is a
phenomenalist, an empiricist
: one who relies on ex
perience to find laws of co-existence, and does not busy
himself with more than the middle levels of knowledge,
eliminating all transcendental researches. On the other
hand, it is none the less true that this aspect of things
is by no means confined to Positivism ; nor can Comte
claim to have been its author or expounder. As Mill
himself says in
&quot; Comte and Positivism,&quot;
&quot; The
Philosophy called Positivism is not a recent invention
of M. Comte, but a simple adherence to the traditions
of all the great scientific minds whose discoveries have
made the human race what it is.&quot; That is to say,
Positivism is only a particular form of the modern
scientific spirit that spiritwhichhad its rise in Descartes
and Newton, and animated all the men of science.
But though Mill thus agrees with the range of subjects
proposed for inquiry, he does not quite, like Comte,
abandon metaphysical speculation altogether witness
many of his chapters in
&quot; An Examination of Hamil
ton.&quot; Moreover, with regard to the fundamental
questions of knowledge the whence and the whither
Mill is not so truculent as Comte ; he says, that
&quot; it is
a mistake on the part of M. Comte to leave no open
questions.&quot; He says again, that
&quot; the positive mode
of thinking is not necessarily a negation of the super
natural.&quot; This is an important qualification of Mill s
agreement with the destructive side of Positivism.40
Beside the destructive side, however, there is a con
structive side to Positivism which shows itself in two
main positions.
^(i.) The historic conception the &quot;loides trois etats&quot;
that the human mind necessarily passes through
three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the
positive.
(ii.) The co-ordination of the Sciences a hierarchy of
arrangement, in which each later or more complex
science depends on the one above it, and each ad
ditional complexity has to be met by new devices in
experimental inquiry. And the order is, Mathematics,
Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Sociology.
Now, with regard to the first of these, Mill appears in
the main to accept it.* With regard to the second, how
ever, there is more antagonism on the part of Mill. He
notices omissions from the Scheme Logic, for instance,
and Political Economy. But the gravest omission is
Psychology. Comte expressly repudiates Psychology,
and for him the only way to arrive at the results at
which Psychology aims, is to pursue Physiology, or
some improved kind of Phrenology. Here Mill, as the
true descendant of a Psychological School, is up in
arms. He points out in answer to Comte s criticisms
that the mind can attend to a great number of im
pressions at once ; that the mind can study some of
its own phenomena by the aid of memory ; and that
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Psychology is much further advanced than that portion
of physiology which corresponds to it.*
We find, in fact, that Comte s attack on Psychology
is not supported by Comtists, e.g., Littre and Lewes.
It had, however, its effect in leading to the substitu
tion of a study of minds in history, in the place of an
exclusively individual introspection to a larger inter
pretation of experience than the merely individual ex
perience which formed the staple of Psychology before.
But now it is not doubted that Psychology is a science ;
the only question is whether it should be considered
a part of Biology, or hold an independent place after
Biology and before ^Ethology, as with Mill.t
Lastly, with regard to Sociology itself, Mill refuses
to allow that the merit of its acknowledgment as a
science belongs to Comte. j &quot;He has not created
Sociology.&quot; The reason of this, in Mill s eyes, is that
Sociology depends on Ethology, and Ethology on
Psychology, and Comte did not do justice either to
Ethology or Psychology. But Mill s assertion is
perhaps too sweeping. Anyone who compares Mill s
chapters on Sociology, with Comte s &quot;Philosophic
Positive,&quot; will see that without the foundation of
Comte Mill s edifice would never have been reared.
Yet still, perhaps, there is some truth in the assertion
* Mill s &quot;Logic,&quot; vol. ii., b. vi., c. iv.




&quot; Comte and Positivism,&quot; pp. 70 and 130.
&quot;
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that that part of the new science of Sociology which is
&quot; Statics
&quot; must be referred to Aristotle as its author,




is nothing more than
the historic law of evolution discussed above. But
Comte s application of the law of evolution to a
Philosophy of History seems to Mill to have been a
great achievement.
Such is the result of an analysis of Mill s relations
to Comte and Positivism, which, perhaps, unduly
lessens his obligations ; for, after all, the formulator
and systematiser of a particular point of view deserves
to be called, in a certain sense, an inventor, and the
man who comes after him finds his work materially
lightened. What Mill himself says of his obligations
to Cornte is perhaps too absolutely put.*
&quot; My work
is indebted to Comte for several important ideas, but a
short list would exhaust the chapters and even the
pages which contain them.&quot;
In concluding this general review of the interval
which elapsed between Hume and Mill, and of Mill s
relations to the successive schools of thought which
appeared in the interval, we may, perhaps, venture
upon a generalisation. Mill is the product of Hume,
artley, and Comte. He is indebted to Hume for
ensationalism, and to Hartley for his Association-
lism, while, in accordance with Comte, he adopts
Phenomenalism.
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In many ways, however, it is Herbert Spencer, and
not Mill, who is the true culmination of this school.
For instead of merely accepting the associational
psychology, he has merged it in the broader law
of evolution. The doctrine of the development of
psychical states out of inseparable associations, is only
a special example of the great law of Evolution. This
universal doctrine of evolution Herbert Spencer has
sought to apply, not only to the development of all
forms of being, whether material or spiritual, but to the
evolution of the relations necessary to knowledge. Thus,
so-calledapriori conditions ofknowledge are shown to be
the results of the development of experience in the race.
In modern times the experimental school of Philo
sophy has widened itself in many directions. Besides
the application of the conception of Evolution, and the
larger interpretation of Psychology, which we have
already noticed, there is a profounder study of Biology,
and the beginnings of an appreciation of the results of
Philological labours (as, e.g., in Mr. Morell). James
Mill saw the importance of this point, but his philo
logy is, of course, antiquated, being based on nothing
better than Home Tooke. These results are due in
large measure to the influence of the better elements
of Positivism, and to the labours in Germany of Her-
bart, Fechner, and Helmholtz. The English writers to
whom I principally refer are Bain, Spencer, Lewes,
Carpenter, Maudsley, Darwin, Morell, and Sully,CHAPTEE IV.
CONSCIOUSNESS.
MILL himself says that he abjures Metaphysics. In
speaking of his relations to Cornte and Positivism, he
says that he agrees with the position of that school, so
far as it rejects First Causes and Final Causes; his




Causes. But he too
is a Psychologist one of those men through whose
labours, as he says, rather grandiloquently,
&quot; The
Sceptre of Psychology has decidedly returned to Eng
land.&quot; And in the foundations on which his Psycho
logy rests, he has to deal with metaphysics, and with
those questions on which metaphysics claims to be
heard. A passage from his
&quot; Examination of Sir
William Hamilton s Philosophy
&quot; * contains explicitly
this avowal.
&quot;
England is often reproached by con
tinental Thinkers with indifference to the higher philo
sophy. But England did not always deserve this
reproach, and is already showing by no doubtful symp
toms that she will not deserve it much longer. Her
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; p. 2, the references throughout are to the 3rd edition.thinkers are again beginning to see, what they had
only temporarily forgotten, that a true Psychology is
the indispensable scientific basis of Morals, of Politics,
of the science and art of Education : that the difficul
ties of metaphysics lie at the root of all science : that
those difficulties can only be quieted by being resolved,
and that until they are resolved, positively whenever
possible, but at any rate negatively, we are never as
sured that any human knowledge, even physical, stands
on solid foundations.&quot; No clearer or franker avowal
could be made by one who is often, though inaccurately,
called an English Positivist.
The first of these metaphysical questions is undoubt
edly concerned with
&quot; Consciousness.&quot; Here again
Mill is explicit.
&quot; When we know,&quot; he says,
&quot; what
any philosopher considers to be revealed in Conscious
ness, we have the key to the entire character of his
metaphysical system.&quot;
* By Mill s own invitation,
then, we have to consider what he believes to be
revealed in Consciousness ; though, to a great extent,
we can only gain this indirectly by discovering his own




&quot; The Relativity of
&quot;
Knowledge,&quot;
&quot; Consciousness as understood by Sir W. -
Hamilton,&quot; and




will suffice to acquaint us with Mill s opinion
on this question. We shall then, after summing up
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; p. 132.the main features of that opinion, be able to consider
how far it may be considered adequate or satisfactory.
&quot; The Relativity of Human Knowledge
&quot;
merely
means, in its broadest and simplest statement, that we
know no more of external objects than what the senses
tell us. But the doctrine itself may be held in two
different forms. We may either mean that not only
are the sensations all that we can possibly know of the
objects,, but all that we have any ground for believing
to exist. Or else, without committing ourselves to
such extreme Idealism, we may only wish to signify by
the doctrine that, while the Ego and the Non-Ego are
undoubtedly realities, yet that they are for us unknow
able, because all that we know about them are the
impressions they make upon us. A further discrimi
nation can, however, be made between two varieties of
opinion, contained in the last form of the statement.
According to one school, we have in Consciousness,
over and above sensations plus an unknowable cause,,
certain forms of sense and categories of the under
standing (e.g., Time, Space, Substantiality, Causality,
&c.) which are modes under which we are forced to
represent to ourselves Thirigs-in-themselves. Accord
ing to another school, these conceptions of Time, Space,
Substance, and Cause are not innate forms of the
mind, but merely
&quot;
conceptions put together out of ideas
of sensation, by the known laws of Association.&quot; It is,
of course, to this last expression of the doctrine, thatCONSCIOUSNESS. 49
being admitted to be without appeal, the question
naturally arises, To what does Consciousness Lear
witness? Hamilton draws a distinction between
&quot; the
facts given in the act of consciousness
&quot; which must
remain undoubted, and
&quot; the facts, to the reality of
which it only bears evidence,&quot; which have been largely
doubted by the majority of Philosophers. This, says
Mill, is a mis-statement of the question at issue.
For]
it is not questioned whether the facts testified to by\
consciousness are true, but whether consciousness does)
actually testify to them at all. It is not that the
testimony is undoubted, and the veracity of the testi
mony called in question, but whether consciousness is
ever witness to anything beyond itself. As a matter
of fact, Philosophers have not disputed the veracity of
consciousness, but rather the fact of its testimony.




&quot; intuitive knowledge,&quot; and it is at once
clear that intuition itself will not tell us what know
ledge is intuitive. It is therefore quite open to doubt
whether consciousness does or does not affirm any
given thing, although at first sight such a doubt
appears impossible^ The question
&quot; what do we know
intuitively,&quot; or
&quot; to what does our consciousness
testify,&quot; is, then, not a matter of simple self-examina
tion,
&quot;
science. There are two methods, Mill
conti&amp;gt; in which the question is sought to be
solv . lie first, the Introspective Method, attempts50 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
by carefully sifting our present states of consciousness
to pronounce those to be ultimate and primary truths,
which we cannot by our analysis resolve into something
simpler. But inasmuch as the laws of Mind are
capable of constructing some conceptions which
become so identified with all our consciousness that
we cannot but think them intuitive, this process
appears to be unsafe. The only way is to discover
what truths there are in the mind, whose origin can
not in any reasonable way be accounted for./^When,
after a study of the modes of generation of the mental
facts confessedly not original, we have applied the
same process to those which are supposed to be original,
then only can we say that the phenomena, which
remain unaccounted for by those modes of generation,
are primary and original elements of the mind. This
is the true psychological method, and Locke, says
Mill, was right in laying the main stress upon the
&quot;
origin of our ideas.&quot;
If now we add to the foregoing Mill s theories of
Mental Association 7 the device by which the growth
of our Ideas out of sensations is to be explained, we




according to Mill. Hume, we remember,
enunciated three principles, according to which ideas
were associated : llesemblance, Contiguity, and Causa
tion._.-
According to Mill the Law of Association hasCONSCIOUSNESS. 51
four exemplifications.* Ideas are associated through
Similarity, and through Contiguity (which may be
equivalent either to Simultaneity or Immediate Suc
cession). The two remaining laws run as follows :
&quot; Increased certainty is given by repetition to Ideas
associated by contiguity,&quot; and
&quot; the inseparability
of the Associated Ideas is transferred to the facts
answering to them.&quot; The characteristic properties
of the Law are that the suggestions they produce
are for the time irresistible, and that the suggested
ideas (at least when the association is of the syn
chronous kind as distinguished from the successive)
become so blended together by a species of
&quot; mental
chemistry,&quot; t that the compound result appears to our
consciousness simple. /Secondary actions of the Law
connect themselves with
&quot; laws of obliviscence,&quot; and
&quot; unconscious mental modifications,&quot; I but these we
need not here particularly define.
We are now in a position to understand Mill s theory
of
&quot;
Consciousness.&quot; Let us try and sum up the main
features.
In the first place, we now see with what propriety
Mill is classed with the Sensationalist School. For
with him, as with them all, man s knowledge is the
result a complex result it is true, but still a result
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; pp. 219, 220.
&quot;
Logic,&quot; Bk. vi.. c. 4.
f Ibid, p. 307.
J Ibid, pp. 313, 314, 335, 341343.
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of what lie derives from the communications of sense.
&quot; He knows nothing more of objects than what the
senses tell him.&quot; Mill, in fact, expressly disavows
any other factor of knowledge in his criticisms of the
)&quot;
pretensions
&quot; of the a priori school. There are no
innate forms or categories of the mind with him.
Those notions which are mistaken for such, are, in
reality, complex results of certain associations set up
among the intimations of sense. Nor yet, according
to Mill, can we embrace the alternative opinion that
in sensation we are immediately conscious of objects.
We are not so conscious immediately, but only
mediately. These objects are not intuitions, they are
inferences. Mill, then, is equally the antagonist of
the Kantian school, and of the Scotch school of Com
mon-Sense, or Realism. He is a follower, an exponent
of that mode of philosophy which was inaugurated by
Locke, and carried on by Berkeley and Hume.
All we know, then, in the first and ultimate resort,
are Sensations. But with the Sensation, there is
something more, Mill thinks, than the momentary
modification of the sensibility. There is also the
Consciousness of the Sensation.
&quot; Sensation and the
consciousness of a sensation are one and the same
thing.&quot; The Sensation, in fact, carries with it, as a
component part of itself, or as identical with itself
(given seemingly in one act), the Consciousness of the
Sensation.CONSCIOUSNESS. 53
In the third place, ideas, as we have them, are
merely worked up (as it were) out of sensations by
certain laws of Association. These are the all-powerful
instruments of the Psychological school, the potent
alchemy by which all sort of unexpected results are
made to appear. Thus it conies about that we are
possessed of notions, concepts, ideas, of which we
can not divest ourselves, which we cannot help apply
ing to things, and which appear to be a necessary part
of our thinking processes, but which are, in reality,
but
&quot; the baseless fabric of a vision.&quot; When the
Sensation, the Consciousness of a Sensation, and the
Laws of Association are enumerated, we have the
whole content of Consciousness, at least on its intel
lectual side. Phenomena of volition, and phases of
emotion do not come within our present scope.
Let us make a few remarks on these three points in
turn. The first position is, as Mill points out, com
mon to all those who believe in
&quot; the Relativity of
knowledge.&quot; Berkeley, Kant, and Mill agree in this,
that all that we can know of objects is what the senses
tell us, i.e., phenomena. The divergence appears
later. Is Sensation the only factor in the body, or
complex, of our knowledge ? Is the whole reality of
knowledge to be explained as the mere product of
Sense ? The cause of our Sensations, whatever it may
be, must be put out of court, for that is unknowable.
Can knowledge, then, be exactly resolved into Sensa-54 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
tions, plus an unknowable cause, or is there anything
more to be said ? Does the mind interfere in any way,
does it add something to experience, which is not
gained from experience? It does, answers Kant, it
adds
&quot;
forms.&quot; It does not, answers Mill : what you
call &quot;forms&quot; are merely the result of sensation,
worked up by purely natural processes of association.*&quot;
Knowledge, then, is experience, and experience is
sensation, according to Mill. Now in knowledge, there
must be some distinction between Reality and Un
reality. What is the Real ? Why is any object that
chair, say a real object for me ? There are two
adequate answers, and, so far as I know, only two.
You may say,
&quot; The object is real for me, because in
sensation I am immediately conscious of an object,
because I am, in this instance, in immediate contact
with objective reality.&quot; That is the answer of Common
Sense, which, in Philosophy, goes by the name of
Realism. Or you may say,
&quot; The object is real, because
it is the construction of my thought, reality being
nothing else than this mental construction. The sensa
tion comes and goes, but my mind fixes it, by bringing*
it into relation with, and distinguishing it from, every
thing else, and so it becomes a real part of my know
ledge.&quot; That is the answer of what may be called
Idealism. Mill is precluded from the first answer,
because with him, in opposition to Hamilton, we are
* See note at end of Chapter V.CONSCIOUSNESS. 55
not conscious of objects intuitively. He is precluded
from the second answer, because with him the mind
does not bring a priori relations to bear upon its
experience. What then is real? The Sensation.
Remember, too, that Mill cannot fall back upon the
general experience of Humanity, or Universal Sen
sationalism, because this is just that further contribution
made by Spencer to the interpretation of Experience.
His position demands that in each man s case his stores
of knowledge arise out of the sensations he has in past
time experienced.
&quot; The
real,&quot; then, is just an indi
vidual man s individual personal sensations, A truly
Protagorean answer.
It is clear, then, that we must analyse
&quot;
Sensation,&quot;
and this leads us to Mill s second position./Sensation
is not merely sensation ; it is more, it is the Conscious
ness of a Sensation, JSTow, in one sense of the words,
to say that a sensation and the consciousness of a
sensation are one and the same thing, is to utter a
truism. It may only be equivalent to saying,
&quot; When
I feel, I feel/ which is obvious and unimportant
enough. But, of course, on such a slender foundation
as this cannot be reared even the ground-plan of
knowledge. In reality this is not what we are intended
to infer from the words. The consciousness of a sen
sation is
&quot; the realising
&quot; of a sensation ; and the
realisation, the making a reality of it, means, when we
analyse it, the bringing it into relation with, and50 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
differentiating it from, any and every other sensation
we experience. To be conscious of a sensation means
that for us we accept it into the mind as one thing, we
so regard it as to make it our own, so that we are able
to identify it again when it recurs. But a mere sensa
tion cannot of itself (unless, indeed, we accept the
doctrines of Realism) make itself different from every
other, so that it can be identified when it recurs. How
can it ? It is but an impression on our sensibility,
that sensibility being completely passive, ex kypothesi.
To raise it from such mere passive impression, to make
it real, must be the work of the mind in some way or
other (however we name it) going out to it, putting
relations on it, and then bringing it into Consciousness
as one thing./ Now, such
&quot; a consciousness of sensa
tion
&quot;
as this is by no means the same thing as sensa
tion ; it is different with all the difference between
having and receiving, between activity and passivity.
When Mill, however, says that a sensation and
the consciousness of a sensation are one and the
same thing, we accept the sentence, unthinkingly,
because it strikes us as a truism in the first sense of
the words. But, really, to raise out of Sensation the
edifice of knowledge, it must be used in the second
sense of the words, because only such confusion
between sentient and mental acts could lead to the
success of the attempt to educe all knowledge out of
sensation. Mill gets all the benefit out of the firstCONSCIOUSNESS. 57
sense of the words, when really what he must mean is
the second sense. But Aristotle knew better, when
he discriminated between the separate intimations of
sense (ftuat atV^creis) and something more than mere
sense (TO S on alcrOavo^Oa.)*
Nor can such an analysis of the primary acts of
sensation be possibly distasteful to Mill. For the
whole spirit of his treatment of Hamilton (e.g. in
the chapter
&quot; The interpretation of Consciousness
&quot;) is
just this, that we must not take what appears to be
primary as if it were really such : it may be secondary:
it may be complex, and not simple
: and only further
analysis can tell. And the Experiential Philosopher




primary.&quot; So we are quite within
the procedure of the proper Psychological method of
Mill, when we take such a sentence as
&quot; sensation and
the consciousness of a sensation are one and the same
thing,&quot; and see whether such a supposed primary act
is, or is not, primary, whether these two are one and
the same thing, or not, whether u a consciousness of
a sensation&quot; is really a simple thing, or a complex
thing.
With Mill s successors, the question is solved in a
bolder manner. To later exponents of the Psycho
logical method, consciousness in its primitive condition
is resolved into two acts, first, the consciousness of a
* De Anima, iii. 1, 2.THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
difference, then the consciousness of a similarity.* But
if sensation at once implies, in one arid the same act,
the perception of a difference between itself and every
thing else, what else is this but
&quot; consciousness testify
ing to something other than itself
&quot;&quot; the knowing
not only that I know, but also what I know&quot; that
identical doctrine of Realism, on which, when uttered
by Hamilton, Mill pours out all the vials of his
scathing criticism ?
We come now to the third point, the Laws of
Mental Association. In his study of Association, Mill
is, perhaps, not so explicit, nor does he embark on
so complete a study, as some of his school, notably
Bain. Yet the matter is one of paramount importance
to him, for by him the idea of cause is reduced to an
inseparable, unconditional association, and on cause
Mill rests his entire theory of reasoning. That Mill
was not unduly insensible to this importance, we may
gather from the following sentence: f &quot;That which the
Law of Gravitation is to Astronomy, that which the
elementary properties of the tissues are to Physiology,
the Law of the Association of Ideas is to Psychology.&quot;
What that Law includes we have already seen. What
we now have to see, and it is a question to which
Mill never addresses himself, is what such Association
*
Cf., among others, Bain,
&quot; Senses and Intellect,&quot; Introduction
;
and
&quot; Emotions and Will,&quot; p. 5G6 and following,
f
&quot; Comte and Positivism,&quot; p. 53.CONSCIOUSNESS. 59
implies, what conditions it postulates either in the
things that are known or the thing that knows. Such
a question, obviously prior to all the exhibitions of the
principle such as we have them in Mill, is exactly that
which no Sensationalist or Experientialist philosopher
handles. And to ignore it means one of two things,
either to be a Realist and not a Sensationalist at all, or
else to be guilty of a want of analysis in those very
intimations of Consciousness which it is the bounden
duty of the experimental psychologist (according to
Mill) thoroughly to sift and analyse.
What then do we mean by the Association of Sen
sations and Ideas? What does such a faculty pre
suppose ?
In the first place, it is clear that associating power
should naturally belong to a mind that is active*
(actively dealing with and transforming sensations)
rather than to a mind that is passive (passively re




is, of course, to do,
rather than to suffer, by the very force of the term.
Such an objection may appear mere haggling over
words, but in reality it leads us to the very core of
* Mill was afterwards not insensible to this. Cf.
&quot; Dissertations
and Discussions,&quot; vol. iii., art. on Bain.
&quot; Those who have studied
the writings of the Association Psychologists, must often have been
unfavourably impressed by the almost total absence, in their analy
tical expositions, of the recognition of any active element as spon
taneity in the mind itself
&quot;
(p. 119).GO THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
the question. We shall see this more clearly by
addressing ourselves to a second point.
&quot; Sensations
and the resultant ideas are associated according to
certain laws.&quot; What does this mean? It means,
obviously, that certain sensations being held in con
sciousness, and their relations, whether of contiguity
or resemblance, being apprehended by the mind,
they are associated together. Any process less than
this would never result in association. Think what
association, in popular senses of the word, means. I
associate together the idea of this paper with the idea
of an essay. That is to say, having received through
my senses certain impressions of a particular kind, to
which after due consideration I apply the name of
paper, I then think of them in relation to other im
pressions which I call writing or reading an essay. It
is clear that if my first impressions had come and gone,
and not been retained, fixed, made permanent, made
real, by my ever-present consciousness, I could never
have thought of them in relation to my second impres
sions, because they would not have been there to be
thought of. In other words, thought has to make
sensations real before they can be associated ; and,
further, they cannot be associated, unless, being made
real, they can be identified when they recur.
This is all upon the supposition which Mill himself
makes for us when he says (as indeed all Sensationalists
must) that all that we can know of things is the sensa-CONSCIOUSNESS. Gl
tions we experience. If that is the case, if sensation
does not testify to anything beyond itself, then a sen
sation, on analysis, is discovered to amount to nothing
more than a particular impression, out of which, by
some further process, knowledge and reality are pro
duced. And then naturally we have to consider, as we
have done, whether a sensation has not to be trans
formed in some way before it can become a permanent
item of knowledge ; and, farther, whether, unless it
be thus transformed, it can ever become real enough to
be associated with any other sensation.
There is, however, another supposition which is
possible. The sensations may come ready-formed, in a
certain way, into our mind. As ready-formed, they must
have, of course, their similarities to and differences
from other sensations already fixed. Then to a mind,
purely passive, there would certainly be open the ten
dency to associate them, for the simple reason that the
sensations themselves in their resemblances, naturally
and of themselves, tend to coagulate into groups. This
supposition I say is possible, but it certainly is not
possible for Mill. For what does it imply? That
sensations are fixed in a certain objective order. That
is, that when we are conscious of sensations, we are
not merely limited within the bounds of consciousness,
but that we are passively recipient of a certain objec
tive order, obviously beyond consciousness. And this
\
means that sensations do not merely imply themselves^62 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
but something more than themselves, viz., their rela
tions, their differences, their resemblances, to and
from one another. But this is a Hamiltonian doctrine,
in other, words, Realism. As such, then, it is not
open to Mill.
The conclusion would appear to be this. If Realism
be accepted, then Sensations can be associated, because
they may be conceived as already existing in a certain
objective order : but if Sensationalism be accepted,
then Sensations cannot be associated at all, for there
must first be a mental process (not
&quot;
feeling&quot;) to bring
them into relations with one another, in order that
they may be associated. So little is it true that
Association explains Thought, that the reverse is the
case. It is Thought which explains the possibility of
Association.CHAPTER Y.
BODY AND MIND.
AFTER the metaphysical question as to the contents
of Consciousness and the extent and validity of its
testimony, we come to the equally serious metaphysical
difficulties which surround the words
&quot; Matter and
Body,&quot; and
&quot; Mind or Self.&quot; Here we have very ex





Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External
World,&quot; and &quot;The Psychological Theory of Matter
how far applicable to Mind.&quot;* With these theories we
must now do our best to acquaint ourselves.
&quot; The Psychological Theory&quot; begins by postulating
certain conditions
&quot; in nature,&quot; and certain conditions
in the mind itself. The conditions it postulates in
Mature are as follows :
(i.) Sensations.
(ii.) Succession and simultaneousness of Sensations.
(iii.) The union of these sensations (both successive
* &quot; Examination of Hamilton s Philosophy,&quot; Chaps. XL and XII.64 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
and simultaneous) into groups, so that the experience
of one sensation authorises us to expect all the rest,
provided that certain antecedent sensations, called
organic, are first experienced.
The conditions which the theory postulates in the
mind itself are
(i.) The Law of Expectation and Memory.
(ii.) The Laws of the Association of Ideas (which we
have already enumerated).
With these assumptions, the Psychological theory
undertakes to prove that the conception of External
Matter would necessarily be generated (if it was not an
original datum of consciousness) by the known laws of
the Mind. The steps in this gradual belief in Exter
nality may be reduced to four :
1. We have a present sensation, and we conceive of
possibilities of sensation (by experience). The possi
bilities of sensation are permanent, while the present
sensation is fugitive.
2. The possibility of sensation refers not to a single
sensation, but to a group of sensations. .Now if I
experience one of them, I know I could experience all.
Hence the possibilities of sensation are conceived of as
permanent, not only in opposition to the temporariness
of my bodily presence, but to the temporary character
of any one of the sensations, of which the group re




is in process of formation.BODY AND MIND. 65
3. Experience of an order in our sensations leads to
the belief in the law of Cause and Effect. Now the
antecedent of a sensation is in most cases a possibility
of sensation, involving a group of contingent sensa
tions. The Idea of
&quot;
Cause,&quot; therefore, is connected
with these permanent possibilities, as are also ideas of
&quot;power,&quot; &quot;activity,&quot; &quot;energy,&quot; and the like: and
the actual sensations are supposed to have a back
ground in the possibilities of sensation. The idea of a
&quot; substratum
&quot;
is now fully developed.
4. One more step, and the analysis is complete. We
find other people acting on the supposition of these
permanent possibilities of sensation as well as our
selves : whereas our actual sensations are not common
to our fellow-creatures. The World, then, of Possible
Sensations, belonging to other people, as well as to
me, is held to constitute an External World.
Such is Mill s extremely acute and subtle analysis of
the growth of our belief in Externality. The conclu
sion is plain. If we ask What is Matter ? the only
answer which a psychologist can give, is that it is
merely
&quot; a Permanent Possibility of Sensation.&quot; This
is all, says Mill, that is essential to the belief in Matter,
whether held by philosophers or ordinary humanity.
Can the same analysis be extended to &quot;Mind?&quot;
Mill believes that, to a large extent, it can. Just as
the Non-Ego might easily have been formed as a
conception, by the known laws of the mind, even if66 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
it was not in consciousness from the beginning, so
also (subject to a somewhat grave difficulty, to which
we shall return later) the notion of the Ego, as
&quot; a
substratum,&quot; might have been formed. For it is
evident that we have no conception of the Mind,
as distinguished from its conscious manifestations,
i.e., sensations and internal feelings. The belief in
mind, therefore, is nothing more than a belief in a
Permanent Possibility of Sequent Feelings. If this
be so, what evidence have we, on this hypothesis, of
the existence of our fellow-creatures, of the existence
of God, of Immortality ? Just as much evidence, Mill
thinks, as we have on the ordinary theory. We believe,
for instance, that our fellow-creatures have minds, be
cause our senses assure us that they have the antece
dent conditions for feelings, (bodies,) and the sub
sequent effects, (acts and outward demeanour.) I
know in my own case that the first link produces the
last only through the intermediate link of feelings. I
infer that this must be the case with them. Now this
inference is just as valid on the assumption that neither
Mind nor Matter is anything but a permanent possibi
lity of Sensation. I am conscious of my own body, as
a group of possible sensations, connected in a peculiar
way with all my sensations, and I observe other bodies
closely resembling mine, except that they are not so
connected. I conclude, therefore, that they are con
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own ^exj^erience of my sensations. So, again, these
bodies exhibit phenomena, which I know in my case to
be the effects of consciousness. Therefore I infer that
these other bodies have a consciousness similar to mine.
Similarly, this theory would resolve the Mind of God
into a series of Divine thoughts and feelings, prolonged
through Eternity, which would cause a belief in it, at
least as strong as the belief in my own. And the con
ception of Immortality, as a thread of consciousness
prolonged to Eternity, leads essentially to the same
results as the ordinary conception.
But still there remains
&quot; a final inexplicability.&quot;
Besides present feelings and possibilities of feelings,
we have Memory arid Expectation. But how can a
series of feelings be aware of itself as a series, so as to
remember a sensation that actually existed in the past,
or expect that a particular sensation will exist in the
future ? Here we are face to face with an insoluble
metaphysical problem.*
&quot; I think by far the wisest
thing we can do, is to accept the inexplicable fact,
without any theory of how it takes place. No such
difficulties, however, attend the Psychological theory
in its application to Matter.&quot;
We are now acquainted with the manner in which,
according to Mill, by
&quot; known laws of the mind&quot; are
generated those notions of the World outside us. and O
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; p. 242.
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of the Self within us, of which we appear to be so
immediately and directly conscious. With Mill, as
the preceding analysis will have shown, these are not
direct, immediate facts of intuition, but acts of pro
gressive belief, which can be demonstrated to have
grown to be what they are. It will be convenient, for
many reasons, to examine the account of Mind, or
Self, first, before proceeding to the treatment of
&quot; The Self&quot; is by Mill, as a disciple of Hume, duly
shown to be but
&quot; states of consciousness.&quot;*
&quot; We
neither know nor can imagine it except as represented
by the succession of manifold feelings.&quot; But what of
the permanent something we seem to be conscious of,
in contrast with the flux of sensations? This, says
Mill (just like the Permanent Substratum we seem
to be conscious of with regard to
&quot; matter
&quot;) is wholly
covered by the expression &quot;Permanent Possibility:&quot;
and so, the mind is nothing but a series of Feelings.




is not wholly covered by the
bare expression &quot;permanent possibility.&quot; There is
something else there is expectation, and there is
memory, still unaccounted for. How can a mere series
be aware of itself in the past, as in memory, or project
itself into the future, as in expectation ? Here, says
Mill, we are face to face with
&quot; a final inexplicability,&quot;
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; p. 235.BODY AND MIND. 69
and the wisest thing is to accept the inexplicable fact
and be content.
Contentment, however, is not an easy virtue, and we
cannot help pausing over this &quot;final inexplicability,&quot;
which looks so remarkably like a confession of failure
by the very words in which Mill states it. Let us
turn, for a moment, to the Psychological Theory of
the Belief in an External World. What does it postu
late according to Mill? It postulates, first, that the
human mind is capable of expectation* But expecta
tion, we find, is just that which the theory of mind
cannot explain and has to accept as a final inex
plicability. Consequently the Theory of the External
World rests on a function of the Mind, which the
corresponding theory finds itself unable to explain.
That is to say, if words have any meaning, that, as the
one theory rests on the other, they both rest on a final
inexplicability. Yet, says Mill, with almost un-
paralleledjiardihood,
&quot; No such difficulties attend the
theory in its application to matter.&quot; f
Though Mill allows himself here to speak of a
&quot; final inexplicability
&quot; he will not allow others to do
the same. In the earlier part of his
&quot;
Examination,&quot;!
he notices with pain that Hamilton had left the rela
tions of Belief and Knowledge unsolved. This he
calls &quot;an extremely unphilosophical liberty&quot; to take.
The next words are exactly applicable to the present
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; p. 219. f Ibid. p. 242. \ Ibid. p. 146.70 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
case. * &quot; But when a thinker is compelled by one
part of his philosophy to contradict another part, he
cannot leave the conflicting assertions standing, and
throw the responsibility of his scrape on the arduous-
ness of the subject. A palpable self-contradiction is
not one of the difficulties which can be adjourned, as
belonging to a higher department of science.&quot; Yet
here, notwithstanding these brave words, is an in
stance of Mill taking an
&quot;
extremely unphilosophical
liberty,&quot; precisely similar to that which he reprobates
in Hamilton.
Of course, the truth is that Mill has here got hold of
that which must be a stumbling-block in Sensational
schemes of Philosophy. You reduce Mind to a series
of feelings, and then have to answer the pertinent
question, How can a series be aware of itself in past
and future time ? The fact is that such a series can
never be summed ; and Personal Identity vanishes in
the process. And yet Mill says that this theory leaves
Immortality just as it was before.
&quot; It is precisely as
easy to conceive that a succession of feelings, a thread
of consciousness, may be prolonged to eternity, as that
a spiritual substance continues to exist.&quot; t If, indeed,
despite the fact of Self being
&quot;
sequent feelings,&quot;
Personal Identity remains all the same, perhaps this




succession.&quot; If it is
&quot; a thread&quot; of
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; p. 147. f Ibid. p. 240.BODY AND MIND. 71
consciousness, it may, of course, be prolonged. Bat a
&quot;
thread&quot; means something one and continuous, and
Sensations coming and going (sequent feelings) are




no means tlic same tiling as
&quot; a succession of feel
ings/ despite Mill s assertion* that
&quot; we are conscious
of a succession, in the fact of having successive sensa
tions.&quot; For &quot;a succession&quot; of feelings, is only
possible to a self-consciousness, which remains constant
and identical throughout all the successive sensuous
modifications. But a self-consciousness, constant and
identical, can never be admitted by Mill.
There is another objection to Mill s account of Mind
or Self which is urged by Dr. M Cosh in his Examina
tion of Mill s Logic, and which furnishes us, at all
events, with a fair
&quot;
argumentum ad hominem.&quot; The
system, of which Mill is an advocate, aims at assuming
as few original principles as possible. Sensationalism,
like Nominalism, accepts William of Ockham s maxim,
&quot; Entia non multiplicanda sunt praster necessitatem.&quot;
This is why it wishes to destroy the a priori element
of knowledge, and postulates only the
&quot; a posteriori&quot;
experience. Let us apply this to our present case.
The old Realistic way of regarding Mind was, of
course, to say that we have in our mental modifications,
an original and intuitive presentation of Self. In sensa
tion it is always
&quot; the Ego having the sensation.&quot;
*
Appendix, p. 256.72 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
No sensation comes without having, as its uniform ac
companiment the consciousness of the Self which feels
it. This is, in truth, the position of Dr. McCosh that
in Self, we have an immediate presentation or intuition.
Mill would replace this by something more scientific.
Instead of the Self, then, one and immediate, what have
we according to Mill ? First, we have Sensations ; then
a series of Sensations; then we have a belief; then, a
belief in Time ; then a belief in Time as permanent,
and of possibilities in Time.* These are obviously not
all one and the same, yet they are all seemingly ultimate
elements. So that instead of one ultimate element, as
in Realism, we have got five or six. This is hardly in
accordance with the spirit of Ockham.
Somewhat different is the conclusion to which
Idealism commits itself in the hands of Kant. Of
course, like all those who admit the essential Re
lativity of Human Knowledge, he must say that
what the Mind is in itself we cannot say, any more
than we can say what Matter is in itself. The Self or
Mind can only be known by its own Forms, its
Categories, its Relations. Apart from such relations
and forms, no human knowledge, we find, is possible.
Now, the application of permanent categories and re
lations is of course necessarily a limitation of know-
* The sentence in Mill is (p. 241)
:
&quot;
They are attended with the
peculiarity that each of them involves a belief in more than its own
present existence,&quot; i.e. a permanent belief of possible sensations in the
future. Here is Time implicit in the earliest operations of consciousnessBODY AND MIND. 73
ledge; it is just that which makes it Relative instead of
Absolute.
Again, human knowledge can only exist as a joint
effect of two opposite factors, Object and Subject. Con
sequently, there cannot be knowledge of merely one of
the component factors. Thus what Self is in itself must
for ever remain unknown.
But this is not the same thing as reducing Self to
Sequent Sensations as Sensationalism does. For ob
serve that we know the Self by the permanency of the
relations, which it applies in the construction of its
experience. Permanent mental categories mean, of
course, as we have all along said, a permanent Self-
Consciousness, ever present as one and identical to all
the impressions of sense, transmuting and transform
ing them out of the bewildering flux into the constant
conditions of knowledge. It is thus that Self-Con
sciousness and Self are assured by an a priori system
of metaphysics.
To some of the successors of Kant, this limitation of
our knowledge of Self seems unnecessary and unreal.
Of Self we ought to have an absolute consciousness
differentiating itself, as in the categories, returning
again upon itself as in the conclusions of a rational
Psychology. &quot;It is an unity in difference, an unity
which can only be known in difference, but still an
unity.&quot;*
* &quot; The Philosophy of Kant,&quot; by Edward Caird, pp. 481, 484, 553, 558.74 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
What is Matter, External Reality, Objective World,
to Mill? It is defined as u the Permanent Possibility
of Sensation.&quot; What are the conditions postulated in
arriving at this result? Three in the mind : viz., Ex
pectation, Memory, and the Laws of Association : three
in &quot;nature&quot;: viz., Sensations, Succession or Simul-
taneousness of Sensations, and the union of these sensa
tions into groups. And so Mill is not wholly averse to
the idea
&quot; that the non-ego altogether may be but a
mode in which the mind represents to itself the possible
modifications of the
ego.&quot; As he says in another
passage,*
&quot; I do not believe that the real externality to
us of anything, except other minds, is capable of proof.
The view I take of externality could not be more
accurately expressed than in Professor Eraser s words :
f For ourselves we can conceive only (1) an externality
to our present and transient experience in our own
possible experience past and future, and (2) an ex
ternality to our own conscious experience in the con
temporaneous, as well as in the past or future ex
perience of other minds.
&quot;
The conclusion is certainly not one with which any
Idealist can disagree. The question, of course, is how
far the means, by which the conclusion is reached, are
satisfactory. The conclusion is one, which is in reality
forced upon Mill by his predecessors in the English
school, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. But we wish to
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; p. 232, note.BODY AND MIND. 75
know, whether, given the essential position of Sensa
tionalism, we can from it explain all that our ordinary
belief in the Existence of an External World contains.
Idealism, as I understand it, believing that all reality
(and therefore the reality of the External World) is the




action, by super-imposition of forms,
categories and relations, intelligibly constructs its
experience into all the Order and Regularity of an
External World, aurots- et6eo-t biavT&v ri]v peOobov
TToioujuej^.* But Sensationalism, necessarily believing
that all reality is actual sensation and its legiti
mate inferences, has to show how far sensations by
themselves can combine, congeal, and crystallise into
what we call External Facts, and thus give rise to the
idea we have of an uniform Order of Nature.
Turning to Mill for guidance, we are first attracted
by his mental postulates. The last of these, the
Association of Ideas, we have already discussed in the
preceding chapter, and the difficulty we there found
was to understand how sensations can, of themselves
and prompted by themselves, associate which they
must do, if the mind is to be conceived of as purely
passive. The other two postulates, Expectation and
Memory, Mill himself gives up, when he comes to
explain
&quot;




those conditions of mental action, which the theory of
*
Plato, Kep. vi. s. 510.76. THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
Sensationalism cannot explain. So that, so far as the
subjective postulates go, we are not much helped by the
Psychological Theory.
We turn, then, to the objective postulates, or Sensa






ing, inasmuch as it, is the growth of the belief in
Nature which we are trying to explain). They are
Sensations, simultaneousness and succession of Sensa
tions, and unions of Sensations into groups. A fourth
condition of Mill which he brings in as testimony to,
or verification of his process, we cannot lay much stress




in relation to their sensations. Of course, we do
not as yet believe in other people s existence, unless we
prove that there is such a thing as Externality. At all
events, we cannot assume the existence of other people,
and bring them in as confirmation of our own subjective
processes, when we are actually tracing the growth of
an Existence other than ourselves.
With regard to the other three, Sensations, of course,





and &quot;union into groups.&quot; The question here again is
the old question Can
&quot; relations
&quot;







&quot; union into groups,&quot; are
&quot;
relations,&quot; and not
sensations at all, requires very little proof. SensationsBODY AND MIND. 77
are one thing
: the links, which unite and combine
them into groups, are quite another/ Now by
&quot; rela-




mind, working up sensations : but Mill cannot accept-
such &quot;a priori&quot; action; consequently the problem
,
becomes pressing Can sensations in and by themselves






? If Association be the weird alchemy which
explains such combination, well and good; but if
Association itself be impossible, except to an active
ancf synthetic self-consciousness, it cannot help us out
of the. difficulty.*
Such appear to me to be the difficulties of Mill s
&quot;
postulates,&quot; and as the whole theory of Externality
rests on the postulates, to these difficulties that theory
is liable. That the conclusion is that of the Idealist
needs no further assertion. If Mill s theory means
anything, it certainly means that Matter is for us not
something objective but merely subjective. Or, as he
expressly states it,
&quot; we know no more of things than
what sensations give us,&quot; and sensations testify to
nothing but themselves.
That being so, we desire to ask two questions before
proceeding further. In the first place, what are we to
understand that knowledge, according to Mill, is?
The answer, if we take these chapters we have been
considering, is perfectly plain. Knowledge is the
* See note at end of Chapter.78 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
process by which ideas are formed out of sensations,
and the agreement or disagreement of these ideas would
seem to be knowledge. We turn to the &quot;Logic,&quot;*
and we find, to our amazement, that the theory
that knowledge has to do with ideas is described
as
&quot; one of the most fatal errors ever introduced into
the philosophy of Logic.&quot;
&quot;
Propositions are not
assertions respecting our ideas of things, but assertions
respecting the things themselves :
&quot;
the doctrine that
&quot; the investigation of truth consists in contemplating
and handling our ideas, or conceptions of things, instead




to the assertion that the only mode of acquiring knowledge
of nature is to study it at second hand, as represented in
our own minds&quot; What are we to make of this ? The
very doctrine
&quot; that the only mode of acquiring know
ledge of nature is to study it at second hand, as repre
sented in our own minds,&quot; which Mill so earnestly re
pudiates in his
&quot;
Logic,&quot; is an exact description of the
doctrine which he as earnestly maintains in
&quot; The
Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External
World.&quot; A better proof could hardly be furnished of
the very different philosophical bases on which his two
treatises respectively rest.
In the second place, we wish to know, with exact





Logic,&quot; bk. I. c. v. sec. 1.
+ Cf. Hume, edited by Green and Grose, Introduction, vol. i. p. 168.
&quot; The juggle which the modern logic performs with the word
phenomenon.
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he mean a simple intimation of a sense-perception, or
does lie mean a single, individual, concrete, real, fact ?
The first is what he ought to mean, by the require
ments of his Sensationalist position. Sense gives us
phenomena ; with phenomena only we have to deal, in
opposition to the so-called noiimena, or things in
themselves ; a phenomenon then is a fact as it appears




&quot; does not mean this,
when we are told, as in the
&quot;
Logic,&quot; that a pro
position deals with
&quot;
phenomena,&quot; and that we are to
study Nature first-hand, and not at second hand, as
represented in our own minds.
&quot; Phenomenon
&quot; does
not mean this, when the Inductive Methods are applied
to phenomena to elicit their laws. Then it means a
real, objective, concrete fact, and if that is immediately
known by us, then we are not in the position of Ideal
ism but of Realism.
The fact is that Mill as an Inductive Logician
supposes that phenomena (objective facts) are imme
diately cognised by us, while Mill as a Psychologist, a
critic of Hamilton, and a metaphysician, supposes that
phenomena, the facts immediately cognised by us, are
mere subjective presentations.
Kant, when he uses the word Phenomenon, means
the product of an objective and a subjective factor,
^he result of a sensation on which has come the mental
elation of Individuality. Mill must mean what Kant80 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
means, minus the a priori mental relation. But only
a Realist like Hamilton can mean that a phenomenon
as an objective fact, is immediately cognised, a philo
sopher who believes the Sensation testifies to something
beyond itself, viz., something external.*
* It is very difficult to be sure of Mill s opinions on some of the
points discussed in this chapter, notwithstanding Mill s important







sensations&quot; equivalent expressions? Mill
says as much, when he quotes with approbation James Mill s
remark,
&quot;
Having a sensation and having a feeling are not two
things. The thing is one, the names only are two
&quot;
(p. 139).




: and in the Logic (Bk. i.) he says,
&quot;
Feeling is a





grow out of sensations by the Laws of Associa
tion in Mill s opinion? On page 13, he says, speaking of the
opinions of his own school,
&quot;
Place, Extension, Substance,
Cause, and the rest, are conceptions put together out of ideas
I of sensation by the known laws of association.&quot; As he has
just been speaking of Kantian forms, I suppose that Time and
Eelations generally are included in the expression
&quot; and the
rest.&quot; In the Appendix, however, he takes a different tone.
||
&quot; We are directly conscious of succession, in the fact of having
successive sensations&quot; (p. 250). But in the next page he
, contradicts himself.
&quot; We are forced to apprehend every part
of the series as linked with the other parts by something in
common, which is not the feelings themselves, any more than




Are &quot;relations&quot; &quot;the conditions which are themselves sensa
tional,&quot; of which he speaks on page 249 ? Are they Hume s
&quot; manners of feeling,&quot; or not ?
3. The words &quot;permanence&quot; and
&quot;possibility&quot; are very perplex
ing.












permanent possibility of sen
sation
&quot;
is an explanation which sadly needs to be explained.






? And how then








THE PRIMARY QUALITIES OF MATTER.
&quot;OF our sensations,&quot;* says Mill,
&quot; there are some
which we usually refer to that thread of consciousness
of which they form a part, and there are others, which
we are in the habit of referring to those Permanent
Possibilities of Sensation, which are, in a sense, realised
in them.&quot; For instance, we have the Sensations of
Pleasure and Pain. These are not referred, as a general
rule, to any outward object, because they are much
more important to us in relation to our own conscious
ness. But there are other sensations, of which, as
sensations, we have only a momentary consciousness :
we immediately pass from them to the Permanent
Possibilities of sensation, of which they are a mark.
In this latter case, what we really know only as an in
ference is thought to be cognised directly, and Percep
tion takes the place of Sensation. The distinction here
noted, corresponds to the distinction between &quot;the
Primary
&quot; and
&quot; the Secondary&quot; qualities of matter.
* &quot; Examination/ c. xiii.
&quot;
Psychological Theory of Primary Qualities.&quot;82 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
Having given the rationale of this historical distinc
tion, Mill proceeds to the examination of what these
Primary Qualities are. Although it is possible that we
might get an idea of Matter from the sensations only
of Smell, Taste, and Hearing, as a matter of fact, these
sensations of Smell, Taste and Hearing are not active
by themselves, but only lead to the formation of groups
of Possibilities of Sensation through their connection
with the sensations referable to the sense of Touch and
the Muscles : in other words, these sensations are
directly connected, either by laws of co-existence or
causation, with the sensations which answer to the
terms Resistance, Extension, and Figure. In con
sequence, the Possibilities of sensations of touch
and the muscles, form a group within the group, an
inner nucleus ; and the remaining possibilities are
regarded either as effects, of which this nucleus is the
cause, or attributes, of which the nucleus is the sub
stance. So our idea of Matter comes ultimately to
consist of Resistance, Extension, and Figure
: these
are held to be its essential constituents.





of muscular action impeded, simultaneously with which
is felt the sensation of touch. These two sensations
are always felt together. We feel contact, and we
know that were we to exercise our muscles, we should
experience resistance. By the Law of InseparableTHE PRIMARY QUALITIES OF MATTER. 83
Association, no sooner do we feel contact, than we
cognise something external, because the former sensa
tion is a mark of the Permanent Possibility of the
sensation of resistance and muscular action. Matter,





because we experience simultaneously a sensation of
touch (of contact) and a sensation of muscular action
impeded.




Theory of Extension derives it also from a sen
sation of muscular energy. It supposes a discrimi
native sensibility in muscular action, which leads the
patient of the sensation to derive from the duration of
the muscular action, the notion of Matter as an ex
tended object, just as he derives from the intensity of
muscular effort, the notion of Matter as a resisting
object. Extension then may be construed as the sen
sation of a muscular effort having a certain continuance,
gained by
&quot; the sweep of the arm
&quot;
or
&quot; the sweep of
the limb,&quot;
* and synonymous with a certain
&quot; volume
of
feeling.&quot; Now it is evident that this notion of Ex
tension expresses it as a series of muscular efforts a
consciousness of successive states of muscular activity.
Whence, then, the
&quot;
simultaneity&quot; with which we grasp
the attribute of extension ?
Although Mill seems to think that the simultaneity
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; pp. 269, 270,
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may be transferred to it from the experience (gained
previously,) of the possible simultaneity of two sensa
tions in the mind at once, he thinks it most probable
that the action of the eye contributes to the notion of
Extension this idea of simultaneity. The Eye gives, in
. a moment of instantaneous consciousness, the notion of
an extended object.* The action of the visual organ,
whether in
&quot; its sweep over a wide prospect,&quot; or
&quot; its
adjustment for a distant view,&quot; enables the visual





tactual sensations, which might be experienced or were
actually experienced, as slowly successive. Hence it
comes that our consciousness of extension is connected
as an appendage with our Sensations of Sight (which, in
itself, is limited to the impressions of Colour) although,
in reality, derived from the sensation of continued
muscular action.
Just as the sensation of continued muscular action
gives the notion of linear extension, and extension in
any direction, so it will also give the notion of situation
and
&quot;
Figure.&quot; And further, it will enable us, by the
muscular sensibility connected with it, to compare
different degrees of the attribute of space, .&amp;lt;?., difference
of length, surface, situation, and form. And lastly,
the velocity of the motion will be also given by
muscular sensibility, and we discover that a slow
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; p. 281.THE PEIMARY QUALITIES OF MATTER. So
motion for a long time is the same as a quicker motion
with less duration.
Thus the jPsychological Theory maintains that the
notion of length_ in space, not being in our conscious-
riess originally, is constructed out of the notion of
I ~ *&quot; -^i^^&quot;^ &quot;~i -i m
length in time by means of muscular and tactual sen-^
sfiEons] But the participation of the Eye in our actual
notion of extension its action taking the place, and
standing as the symbol of possible, or actually-realised
muscular sensations very much alters its character,
and makes us imagine that for us Extension derives its
meaning from a phenomenon which is synchronous and
not successive, the reverse of which, according to Mill,
is really the case.
Our first task must be to see Mill s position histori
cally, in this question of the Primary Qualities of
Matter. Mill had to explain constructively, what
Hume and Berkeley had done destructively. Locke s
position is that, more or less, of Common-Sense.
Secondary Qualities are subjective, Primary Qualities
are objective. With regard to the first, we are not
outside of the limits of our own consciousness; with
regard to the second, we are outside, because we are




Berkeley simply destroyed all difference between the





solidity,&quot; were both equally relative86 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
to our own conscious and subjective apprehension.
Hume went even farther than this : the so-called
Primary were in a sense, less real than the Secondary,
because more dependent on mental construction.
&quot;
Solidity,&quot; for example, is more of
&quot; an idea,&quot; and
therefore less
&quot;
real,&quot; than a feeling to which we give
the name
&quot;
sweet,&quot; which is an immediate sensuous
impression.
After these two philosophers, the question still
remained, and required an answer why, if both sets
of qualities rest on the same subjective basis, is our
idea of substance made up rather of qualities, like Re
sistance, Extension, and Figure, than of qualities like
Hot, Sweet, arid Cold ? This is the question to which
Mill had to address himself: and his answer, practi
cally, comes to this that sensations given in touch
have more the character of permanency. For the rest,
his reply merely is a re-affirmation of the fact : we do,
as a matter of fact, connect our ideas of Externality
and Matter with sensations of Touch (and afterwards,
he says, of Sight) rather than with Sensations given by
the other three senses, Taste, Smell, and Hearing.
What, then, are the Primary Qualities, according to
Mill? Resistance, Extension, arid Figure. Of these,
incomparably the most important to the metaphysician





no discussion, if the others are established ; and u Re
sistance
&quot; need not occupy us long. Resistance isTHE PKIMARY QUALITIES OF MATTEB. 87
gained by the sense of energy impeded, the intensity of
effort giving us the notion of Matter as a Resisting
Object. Of course it is obvious that mere touch, as
&quot; a
surface-sense,&quot; cannot yield us these results : there
can be, in mere touch, no measure of intensity of
effort, or impeding of energy. These indications are
the results of a sort of sixth sense, newly-invented,
of which Hume was ignorant the Muscular Sense*
Mere touch gives us, we are told, only
&quot; the peri
phery
&quot; of our bodies : the muscular sense gives us
something further resistance outside, corresponding
to muscular reactions inside. Physiologically, the
Muscular Sense is defined as
&quot; a Motor Nerve, under
the control of the will, going out from the Brain, and
moving the muscle attached to it ; and of a Sensor
Nerve, going back to the brain and giving intimation
of the motion.&quot; Sir Charles Bell and Dr. Thomas
Brown, the one a physiologist, the other a psycho
logist, brought into prominence the muscular sense :
Mill and Bain make large use of it ; in Germany,
Muller, in England, Dr. Carpenter, have carried on an
extensive inquiry into its nature, f
But we must not allow this account of the Muscular
Sense to disconcert us, just as though we had here
some means of apprehending an actuality, external to
our consciousness. For of course, when we say that
* Cf.
&quot;
Logic,&quot; bk. i. c. iii. s. 7, par. 3.
t McCosh,
&quot; Examination of Mill.&quot;88 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
the Muscular Sense gives us, by means of the sense of
energy impeded, the idea of Resistance, accurately in
terpreted, this language does not refer to any pheno
mena other than strictly subjective.
&quot; Sense of energy
impeded
&quot;




is strictly a feeling, and
does not of itself and by itself testify to anything more.
If once we have given to us, in some way, the External
Object, then we see at once that the Muscular Sense
may immediately acquaint us with the fact that that
External Object is a resisting one : but if all that we
have to start with is the Muscular Sense, as a feeling
of some sort, and its intimation to us, viz., Resistance,
we cannot, except with an obvious
&quot; salto mortal^&quot;
arrive at an External Object, of which this Resistance
(which we only know as
&quot;
feeling &quot;) is a quality.
Possibly, too, it is right to give some weight to an
objection urged by Dr. McCosh. He notices, in the
account given of the action of the Muscular Sense, the
part played by volition, which at once introduces an
element above sensations. We may draw out the
objection in this way. The Motor-Nerve is under the
control of the Will. Now if the Will is to act, if
volition determines on setting a particular member in
action, we must obviously have formed some idea of
the member, before we can make a volition concerning
it. That is to say, before the Muscular Sense can be
exerted, we must have some idea of a member, whichTHE PRIMAKY QUALITIES OF MATTEE. 89
member is, of course, external to consciousness, and
yet the Muscular Sense is supposed to originate the
idea of Externality.
Nor is the whole theory free, even physiologically,
from doubt. That on which the inference of Ex
ternality mainly depends, the Muscular Sense and its
discriminative sensibility (the power, that is, which it
has of distinguishing between a lesser and a greater
amount of intensity of effort or impediment of energy)
has been actually denied by some physiologists.*




a difficult conception to account for : nor is this re
markable. For our conception of Space is, essentially,
&quot;
synchronous,&quot; i.e., we embrace together, in one and
the same notion, the various parts into which Space





experience,&quot; we can get to nothing more than n
&quot; succession









is meaningless. For feelings must be
successive: and therefore the notion of Space which




It will be interesting to observe Hume s account of
&quot;
Space,&quot; f as illustrating this Sensationalistic diffi-
* Cf. E. H. Weber, quoted in Abbot s
&quot;
Sight and Touch,&quot; who
refers also to Aubert and Kammler.
f Hume s
&quot;
Treatise,&quot; bk. ii. s. iii.90 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
culty, before we turn to Mill, and his attempt to over
come it. From whence is derived the Idea of Space ?
Hume tells us, it is derived from eyesight. What,
then, we ask, does the eyesight testify to, considered
as mere feeling? Obviously, Colour. We have a
feeling of colour, in the case of a table (which is
Hume s illustration), a feeling of brown colour. Can
it testify to anything more ? Certainly not, for directly
we rise from mere sensations of colour, and speak of
colour, as appearing in different relations, shaded in
one part, bright in another and go on to speak of a
particular object, which is revealed to us by, or is the
complex of, these relations, we are deserting the sphere
of mere feeling
: we have got to conceptions, to mental
grouping of sensations.
Then, if extension be derived from the eyesight, and
the eyesight, considered as pure feeling, testifies only
to colour, is
&quot;
extension&quot; the mere feeling of colour?
This will hardly be satisfactory for the mathematical
sciences, which are founded on the abstract idea of
space or extension, for they can hardly rest on such a
meaning of extension as this. Moreover, as feelings
are successive, one gone before another comes (unless
they are held together by the constructive force of the
mind), the only idea of space they can give rise to, is
equivalent to
&quot; a sequence of sense-impressions
:
&quot;
in which case, the table, as interpreted by eye
sight, can be only a succession of brown feelings,THE PEIMAEY QUALITIES OF MATTER. 91
and not (what it should be) a co-existence of brown
parts. Of course Hume s literary skill enabled
him to disguise this difficulty. In the sentence, in
which he discusses the growth of the idea of extension
he speaks of
&quot; my senses conveying to me the impres
sions of coloured points , disposed in a certain manner.&quot;
The artifice here lurks in the italicised words.*






disposition of points in a certain
manner ?
&quot; Here is, at once .an illegitimate, quasi-
objective reference. For he cannot mean by &quot;coloured
points,&quot; mere
&quot; moments of sentient consciousness,&quot;
&quot; moments of feeling,&quot; because these cannot be said to
be disposed in a certain manner. Yet, by the substitu
tion of




&quot; mere sensations of colour,&quot; Hume has
gained exactly that co-existence and reality, which we
find in our common idea of space, but which his system
cannot in verity allow of.
Let us turn now to Mill s theory of the gradual for
mation of the Idea of Extension. Shortly put, it is
this. Just as the intensity of muscular effort gave us
the idea of Resistance or, as Mill puts it (with what
ever amount of truth), the idea of matter as a resisting
body
: so does the duration of muscular effort give us
the idea of Extension, or Matter as an extended object.
The growth of the idea of Space can be traced as the
* Cf. Green s
&quot; Introduction to Hume,&quot; vol. i.92 THE METAPHYSICS OP MILL.
development of Touch-sensations, combined with a
certain effort of the Muscular Sense, continued for a
certain time.
Now it is worth noticing, in passing, that the Idea of
Time * is pre-supposed in the account of the origin of
Space. The very word &quot;duration&quot; of Effort has no
meaning without the acknowledgment of Time, as a
pre-supposed Idea. This is, of course, obvious, but it
is not therefore unimportant. For Time appears to be
* With regard to
&quot;
Time,&quot; and our perception thereof, Mill ap
pears, in the main, to accept the position of Hume that the Idea of




&quot; An entity called Time, I
do not and need not postulate.&quot; Cf. what he says in the opening
chapter on
&quot; the Kelativity of Knowledge,&quot; and James Mill s
&quot;Analysis.&quot; Vol. ii. p. 134. &quot;Time is a collective name for the
feeling of the succession of feelings.&quot;) It is not, then, a form,
or conception prior to Experience, and applied to any and every
experience we obtain by an inevitable necessity arising from the
mind itself : it, like everything else, is a product of Experience
: and
so far as the principle holds that an abstraction, as the work of
thought, is less in contact with reality than the concrete
&quot; facts
&quot;
from which it is obtained, the idea of Time is less real than that
succession of sensations from which it is an abstraction.
If this be Mill s position (and his system as an Experimental System
demands it) the criticism is pertinent which asks, whether any amount
of successive sensations can give rise to the conception of a succession
of sensations ? It can only in one way, if there be a mind present to
each sensation, holding them in due relations to one another, and
transforming into permanencies the perishing series of sense-impres
sions. For we can only talk of a succession, if the first of the series
be in our minds equally with the last. Time, as a mental form,
applied to sense, gives rise to the conception
&quot; a succession of sensa
tions:&quot; but the reverse hardly holds in the same way; sensations
succeeding one another cannot and do not give rise to the Idea of
Time,THE PRIMARY QUALITIES OF MATTER. 93
itself a derivative, not a primary idea. It is derived
from the sequence of sense-impressions. Therefore
Space is derived from that which is itself derived from
sequent sensations. And so before we get to Space at
all, we have to face the difficulty, how can sequent
sensations give rise to the idea of Sequence itself?
The difficulties of Space-derivation are dependent on
the prior difficulties of Time-derivation.
Let us however pass over this point, and look nar
rowly at the language in which Mill and Bain describe
how these Tactual and Muscular Sensations originate
the idea of Extension.
The muscular sensation * &quot;
gives the feeling of linear
extension, inasmuch as this is measured by the sweep
of a limb, or other organ, moved by muscles.&quot; And




&quot; the total sweep of the
arm,&quot; &c. Now
here is a piece of literary artifice, not quite so clever as
Hume s, because the elder philosopher was an adept at







are at once intelligible, if we pre-suppose the idea of
space: but what meaning are we to attach to them
without such pre-supposition ? What is
&quot;
sweep,&quot; if
not &quot;sweep through space? &quot;f And if these words
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; p. 2G9, &c.
f The argument is urged by many critics. Mill s answer in the
note to the 13th chapter is, that both he and Bain have been careful
to limit the expressions to
&quot;
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are only used metaphorically, how are we one step in
advance in the origination of Space, or what definite
meaning can they be supposed to convey? I say
nothing of the words
&quot; of the arm
&quot; in these expres
sions : though indeed they must mean that in some
way or other, we have got hold of
&quot; the arm&quot; as an
objective reality, apart from and beyond our mere sub





&quot; words which have an unmis
takable objective reference, if they are to mean any
thing. Mill, in his turn, talks of &quot;sweep&quot; and
&quot;
range of arm and limb,&quot; which, if they are to mean
anything, must likewise involve an objective reference,
viz., the pre-supposition of Space itself, as a reality.
However this may be, the Sensationalistic difficulty
of constructing co-existence out of succession, still
remains. The idea of Space grows somehow out of the
idea of Time. Successive sensations, given by Touch
and the Muscular Sense, produce ultimately the idea of
Space, which is not successive which is, in reality
nothing, if it is not the co-existence of parts.
It is the merit of Mill that he sees this difficulty
clearly, and that he tries to meet it. It is the Eye, he
says, which converts, or seems to convert succession
into co-existence.*
&quot; The conception we now have of
Extension or Space is an eye-picture, and compre
hends a great number of parts of Extension at once, or
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in a succession so rapid that our consciousness con
founds it with simultaneity.&quot; Feelings of Touch are
successive
; then come the feelings given us hy the
Eye, and the result is that that which is originally
known as successive, now becomes &quot;embraced&quot; as a
co-existence.
The exact opinions of Mill with regard to the Sensa
tions given by the Eye, are hard to be sure of. I am
by no means certain that I really apprehend his mean
ing. What, in the case of the Eye, is immediate, in
tuitive, and what is derivative, inferential ? Berkeley,
in
&quot; the Essay on Vision,&quot; said that Colour is the im
mediate object of the Eye, and Distance is an inference.
Mill, if we may judge from what he says in other places
as e.g. in his
&quot; Dissertations and Discussions
&quot; *
seems to defend Berkeley s theory of vision against his
critics. So here he seems to agree that
&quot; the distinctive
impressibility of the Eye is for Colour.&quot; f If that is
the case, it is obvious that the Eyesight, as feeling,
must give us successive sensations, in our notion of
Space, just like any other Sense, and not co-existence
of parts. The case is not really altered by speaking of
the active or muscular sensibility of the eye. The
&quot;
sweep
&quot; of the eye cannot give us, any more than the
sweep of an arm, aught but successive sensations. Still
the idea of co-existence of parts the essential idea of
Space remains unaccounted for.
* Vol. ii. art. on Bailey.
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Later speculations cut the knot by practically deny
ing the truth of Berkeley s analysis. Miiller supposes
that vision at once and immediately perceives a super
ficies.* Thus, length and breadth, two dimensions of
space, are at once perceived. It is only when we come
to the perception of a Solid, that we leave the sphere
of immediate intuition, and reach inferences from sen
sations, or a judgment. A superficies, accordingly, is
immediately perceived by the eye: a solid is only
mediately perceived, or reached by a judgment or infe
rence. If Mill believed this, he could, of course, prove
that co-existence of parts is given by the Eyesight
:
for the Eye would then immediately
&amp;lt; embrace as a
superficies (which is extension) that which is only suc
cessively attained by touch-sensations. But he could
* Kather different is Helmholtz who disagrees with and criticises
Miiller. See his article on
&quot; The Recent Progress of the Theory of
Vision.&quot; in the
&quot; Preussische Jahrbiicher
&quot; of 1868, translated in Dr.
Atkinson s
&quot;
Popular Scientific Lectures of Helmholtz.&quot; In that
essay, although there are many sentences, which are thoroughly in
the spirit of the Berkleian analysis (e.g.,
; It is clear that the quality
of our sensations, and especially our sensations of sight, does not
give us a true impression of corresponding qualities in the outer
world&quot;), the Binocular system of vision is supposed to make some
difference, and (if I understand it aright) to generate our notions of
distance. For the two eyes look each at different parts of the object
before them. Of course, one has to learn to interpret one s signs ;
but the Idealist contention is that one cannot do this without the
a priori form of Space. Once given that, the signs can be inter
preted, the different pictures given by the two eyes being now
recognised as being in different parts of Space. But only starting
from one s different eye-feelings, how is the notion of Space to be
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only do so by practically denying Berkeley s Theory of
Vision (which he is far from doing)
: and then it would
surely be a work of supererogation* to trace the growth
of
&amp;lt;
Space out of Tactual and Muscular Sensations, for
to the Eye, Space would be an immediate intuition.
Here, as elsewhere, Mill would seem to halt be
tween the Sensationalism he inherited from Hume and
Berkeley, and the later speculations of the Experiential
I
School. He acknowledges that Space, according to ;
Tactual intimations, can only be a succession of sensa- fl
tions ; but he seems to think that the Eyesight can
grasp succession, as co-existence, which it can not do,
unless it immediately perceives Space in two dimen
sions. If it does so perceive Space, the whole Psycho- |
logical analysis is unnecessary. Space is not an inference
at all, it is an Intuition.
* At least, for the present purpose. The inquiry as to the manner
in which persons born blind derive
&quot;
Space
&quot; from Touch, of course,
remains.CHAPTER VII.
CAUSATION AND THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE.
AFTER our conceptions of Body and Space, and the
manner in which we come to entertain them, our next
concern is with the constitution of the Natural World
and our belief in the processes of Nature. We have,





On what do Induction and Inductive processes de
pend ? The ground of Induction,* answers Mill, is the
Uniformity of Nature, which may be thus defined :
that what is true in certain cases is true of every
other case resembling the former in certain assignable
respects. How is this Uniformity of Nature proved ?




tions that we have carried out in past time.
The question naturally occurs,
&quot; Is not an
c inductio
PIT simplicem enumerationem a very fallacious one?
&quot;
I *
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It is, and it is not, answers- Mill. It is in certain
cases cases of a limited range of experience. It is
not in others. In the particular case we are consider
ing-, it is not fallacious for this reason : the evidence




from so large a field of experience, that any real excep
tions, if any such existed, must have come under our
notice. These innumerable Inductions, coinciding in
one result, and all pointing in one direction, cover the
whole field of Nature s operations. Therefore here the
&quot; enumeratio simplex
&quot;
is adequate to prove the conclu
sion. Or, as he says in a later chapter,*
&quot; The subject-
matter of our law is so widely diffused that there is no
time, place, or set of circumstances in which it is not
fulfilled. It is clear, then, that the law can not be
frustrated by any counteracting causes, except such as
never occur, and cannot depend upon any collocations
except such as exist at all times and
places.&quot; Further,
of those phenomena of which we do not positively know
it to be true, one after another is constantly passing
from this class into that of known examples of its
truth, and any deficiency, or absence of positive know
ledge of its truth, may always be accounted for by the
variety and obscurity of the phenomena in these special
cases.
At the same time,- Mill adds, we cannot extend the
validity of this Law of Causation beyond the limits of
* &quot;
Logic,&quot; bk. iii. c. xxi. vol. ii.
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our Experience
: we cannot say that every event
follows from a cause in distant stellar worlds, for
example
: such an extension is unauthorised and
illegitimate.*
Another difficulty occurs. If Induction itself rests
for its validity on the Uniformity of Nature (as its
major premiss), and the Uniformity of Nature rests
on a number of Inductions, are we not here in a
vicious circle of inference ? The answer, says Mill,
lies in a proper view of the function of the Major
Premiss in a Syllogism. If we suppose that the
conclusion really rests on, and is proved by, the
Major Premiss, then obviously we cannot but suppose
that the circular form of the reasoning given above, is
fatal to its validity. But such is not the function of
the Major Premiss. It is but the summary, the
record, the memorandum in concise language of our
experience, so far as it has gone. Both the conclusion,
therefore, and the major premiss are alike conclusions
from the antecedently observed particular cases.
Hence, both the conclusion reached by Induction, and
the major premiss the Uniformity of Nature are
proved by the instances we have observed before, i.e.
9
by our experience.!
After these statements of the absolute validity of
the Uniformity of Nature, we proceed to Causation,
* &quot;
Logic,&quot; bk. iii. c. xxi. s. 4. last par.
f Ibid., bk. iii. c. iii. s. 1
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and the definition of a
&quot;
Cause.&quot;*
&quot; The notion, of
Cause, being the root of the whole theory of Induction,
it is indispensable,&quot; says Mill,
&quot; that this idea should,
with the utmost practicable degree of precision, be
fixed and determined.&quot; Now the Law of Causation is
this : (1) That every phenomenon, which has a begin
ning, must have some Cause, and (2) That given the
Cause, the effect will invariably follow (minus counter
acting causes). What, then, is a Cause? It is an
antecedent, and further, it is an invariable antecedent.





: it is, most frequently, an
assemblage of phenomena, the effect following upon a
sum of several antecedents. We may, it is true, draw
a distinction between a Cause, and the Conditions or
the Occasion, the Cause being, as it were, the last in
order of time, immediately following on which occurs
the event; but this is a convenient, more than a
logical distinction. The Cause is the sum of condi











&quot; those which must be
absent&quot;). These negative conditions are further speci
fied as being, either
&quot;
Counteracting Causes&quot; (which
neutralise the effect of the other antecedents by pro





destroy the effect, by simply arresting it).
* &quot;
Logic,&quot; bk. iii. c. v. s. 2.102 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
So far then, Cause is defined as
&quot; the invariable
antecedent, or antecedents.&quot; Is this all that there is
in our idea of Cause? No, for day is the invariable
antecedent of night (and vice versa), and yet no one
calls day the cause of night. Why is this ? Because
the sequence of night upon day depends upon another
condition viz., the rotation of the earth and the con




: it must produce the effect, under
any imaginable supposition with regard to other things.
If night followed day, whether the rotation of the earth
ceased or not, then day might rightly be called the
cause of night. But it does not, therefore it is not
the cause. The Cause, then, is the invariable, uncon
ditional antecedent.
&quot; The Cause is the antecedent, or
concurrence of antecedents, on which the effect is in
variably and unconditionally consequent.&quot;
*
Some further questions, relative to this general sub
ject, are discussed by Mill, which we may briefly
summarise.







a real one ? No, it is merely verbal, patients are always
agents. A man s condition, when he takes prussic acid,
is as much the cause, or agent of his death, as the
prussic acid, t
Must a cause always precede, by ever so short an
* &quot;
Logic,&quot; bk. iii. c. v. s. G. f Ibid. s. 4.CAUSATION, AND UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 103
interval, its effect ? No, Mill seems to answer ; some
times it is simultaneous.*
Is the type o^ Causation, and the only source from
which we derive the idea, our own voluntary agency ?
Certainly not. For the idea of
&quot; Power
&quot; cannot be
derived from my will producing my bodily motions,
from Mind acting on Body, because Mind only acts on
Body mediately, through a chain of antecedents and con
sequents (our nerves and muscles) of which we are not
conscious. Nor yet can it be said that the Idea of
Power comes from the power of Self over the volitions,
&quot; from myself, producing my Will,&quot; because Mill pro
fesses that so far as he is concerned, he is not conscious




as applied to causation, is merely a
delusion : all that experience does or can generate is an
idea of invariable sequence.!
It is not difficult to find difficulties in Mill s account
of Causation, for Mill himself, with that frank incon
sistency, with which many of his theories are ex
pounded, has taken care to leave them on the surface.
The first difficulty is concerned with the relation
which he exhibits between the Law of Causation and
* &quot;
Logic,&quot; bk. iii. c. v. s. 7.
f Mill s
&quot; Examination of Hamilton,&quot; c. xvi. pp. 35G-3G1. Cp.
&quot;
Logic,&quot; bk. iii. c. v. s. 11.104 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
the Law of the Uniformity of Nature. They are, of
course, not the same thing. The first means that
nothing happens without a cause of some sort, the
second that the whole physical world exhibits uniform
methods and laws. The first means that we are com
pelled to believe that every antecedent has a conse
quent, and every consequent an antecedent, the second
that we are compelled to believe that uniform sequences
of events and causes hold in every possible department
of our knowledge about Nature.
What is the relation between these two ? Evidently
this that from the first viz., that there is a regular
succession in phenomena we arrive at the second-
that all nature exhibits uniform laws. But in all
extensions of our knowledge of physical and other
phenomena, how do we proceed ? We assume that, if
we look long enough, the event we are inspecting will
be proved to have a cause, because all nature is uni
form. Thus the ground of a fresh Induction is that
which is itself the last result of an Induction. We
may press the difficulty even a little farther. It is
obvious that until we have exhausted all the different
departments of knowledge about Nature, we cannot be
perfectly sure that the Law of Causation holds every
where. It must be therefore dangerous to bring in the
assumption of uniformity to fortify ourselves in reducing
fresh investigations into cases of this law of uniformity.
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sion of our syllogisms about Nature is proved along
with the assumed major premiss by the amount of
cases we have observed before. That is to say that
experience proves concurrently both the increasing
validity of the General Law of Uniformity and the
particular instance we are at present observing. Such
a conclusion, then, depends strictly on the Experience
gone through, and both General Law and Particular
Fact are valid exactly to the same extent viz., so far
as they are inferences from past experience. This is





The difficulty with regard to this circular argument
that Induction depends on the Law of Uniformity
arid Uniformity itself depends on Induction has been
met in other ways, and some of them appear certainly
more satisfactory than Mill s avowal, which makes our ;
belief in Uniformity depend on our past experience.
The later Experiential School would meet it, I
suppose, in this way. It is true that in fresh cases of
Induction, the Uniformity of Nature, as a Law, is
logically prior to this or that uniformity which we prove
by its means. But though logically prior, it yet may
be historically posterior. Logically, a postulate,
it yet
may be, historically, a product. In other words, men
start now in their fresh explorations with the belief in
Uniformity, but the belief itself is the slow result of103 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
accumulated experiences in past generations. Prior to
the Individual, it is posterior to the Race, just like
those notions of Time and Space, which men begin
with now, as a priori notions, though in reality they
are (according to Mr. Herbert Spencer*) the products
of their fathers a posteriori experience. The same
discrimination between logical priority and historical
[posteriority
serves also to explain other notions.
Thus, for example, logically, the Universal is prior to
the Particular : historically, the Particular is prior to
the Universal. Logically, Duty, as an idea, is prior
to particular cases of
&quot; what ought to be done:&quot; his
torically, we arrive at our idea of Duty after a series of
particular dutiful acts.
But this explanation is due to that enlargement of
the sphere of Experience, which we have as the
note of more modern experientialists than Mill.
Experience, to them, is not experience of the indi
vidual, but experience of the race : arid so many of
these difficulties (among others the proof of the
validity of Geometrical axioms) are met. But in Mill,




all we have is a
belief in Uniformity seemingly proportionate to the
experience which we, not our forefathers, have under
gone. However capable of extension the theory may
be, as a matter of fact, by Mill it is not so extended.
* H. Spencer s
&quot; First Principles,&quot; pp. 162 165.
&quot;
Psychology,&quot;
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The other method of explanation is
&quot; the Simple
Intuitionist Method,&quot; as Mill calls it, which he ex
pressly rejects. In its best expression, it is this :
that Causation, Causality, is a mental category, with
which we start to make our experience of Nature in
telligible for us. It cannot be intelligible, unless it is
reduced to order. Experience, as furnished by sequent
sensations, is a chaos. Only Thought can produce
Order by the superimposition of forms, relations,
categories. Only Thought can produce therefore (in
the only sense in which the word is capable of any
meaning)
&quot;
Reality.&quot; Causation being, then, a cate-,^
gory, a form, with which we start prior to experienced
and not given by experience, it is as clear as daylight
why the ground of Induction is the belief in Universal
Causation. We reduce our fresh experiences to order
simply by bringing upon them the category of
Causality.
From this point of view, all Mill s instances to
prove that the belief in Uniformity has grown to be
what it is, and was not believed in originally, are so
many fresh proofs of the originality of our form of
Causality. Tv-^n, TO avro^arov^ and the rest of them, were
so many provisional explanations of Causation, await
ing further experience. The whole content of our form
of Causality was not yet complete ; and in the absence
of such full content, (only to be gained by experience)
the explanations of the Greek philosophers are to us108 THE METAPHYSICS OP MILL.
inadequate, though they were to them possibly quite
adequate from the point of view of their incomplete
experience. The form was there, as a 8uva/xts, waiting
for content, waiting for experience, waiting to become
erreAexeia. The very age of Mythology gives the
best illustration of how natural it is for men to apply
categories of Causation. The Greeks, in a Mytho
logical age, were anxious to provide causes for every
thing, causes rfir the wind, in an .ZEolus, causes
for thunder in Hephsestos, causes for sea-storms, in
Poseidon. They did not realise, it is true, the
Uniformity of Nature, that all Nature exhibits uni
form processes of action and abjures theories of Oc
casionalism ; they simply could not : they had not had
the experience. But they strictly believed that every
event has a cause of some sort, however fancifully the
category of Causation was applied. Still less, of
course, can it be urged that Human Volition forms
any exception to this process. Mill himself notes that
some Intuitionists believe that the relation of the Will
or Ego to action, forms the type of all Causation. And
naturally so ; for men, in their application of the
category of Causality, are guided by those phenomena,
of which they have earliest experience. That some
philosophers do not believe in
&quot; the uniformity of
Nature
&quot; as applied to the sphere of human volition,
does not in any way affect the question of the origin
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not believe that a motive stands to an act, in precisely
the same relation as a physical antecedent stands to a
physical consequent, they do not, therefore, believe
that human action is uncaused : the Ego, the Self is
the Cause, a free cause, a first cause.
Leaving now the relation between Causation as a
Law and the belief in the Uniformity of Nature, let us
proceed to Mill s definition of Cause. Here we had
better put aside all collateral issues, and confine our
selves to the main point.*
What is a Cause ? It is an invariable unconditional
Antecedent. Let us take each of these attributes in
turn.
The relation of Cause and Effect, of Antecedent
and Consequent, is discovered by Experience, and yet
Cause is the invariable antecedent.
Does not this word &quot;invariable&quot; open the whole




Difficulties there undoubtedly are in some of Mill s subsidiary
remarks. E.g. The cause precedes the event, says Mill, sometimes,
and yet the distinction between Agent and Patient, is utterly unreal,
the Patient is always an Agent. If so it would obviously be truer to
say, the Cause never precedes the Effect, for the Effect (being the
Patient) is always a Cause (Agent) and therefore can never be
posterior to it. Or again, it is not true, according to Mill, to say
&quot; cessante causa cessat et effectus,&quot; for a body through which a sword
has passed, continues dead, even when the sword has been removed.
That is to say, the patient continues, the agent is removed. Yet
Patients are always Agents. The Body must be conceived of as
continuously the Cause of its own death a somewhat unnecessary
inversion of ordinary language.110. THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
mon parlance mean ? That to which no exception has
been or can J)e discovered. The last part the words
&quot; can be
&quot;
are as important as the first. But what
must
&quot; invariable
&quot; mean to Mill ? That to winch no
exception has leen discovered. In other words
&quot; in
variability&quot; is exactly measured by the amount of ex




Inconceivability,&quot; for Mill, is
strictly relative to experience
: so too is invariability.
It can have no other meaning.
The misfortune is that Mill is supposed to be in
advance of Hume, because he is more scientific. Which
is the more logical here? Hume said that Experience
of antecedents and consequents led to the formation of
a custom of expecting the consequent when we found
the antecedent. Mill says that the Cause is the ante
cedent, invariable so far as our experience has gone.
The difference between the custom (founded on past
experiences) of finding a consequent, when we come
across an antecedent, and Mill s assertion that Cause
is the antecedent, invariable, so far as our experience
lias gone, is certainly not very great. If there is
nny difference, it is that Hume confines himself
within what his system allows him, while Mill, in
using the word invariable, does not always explain
that he only means &quot;unvaried.&quot; As to any real
objective validity in Causality, it must be denied by
one just as much as by the other. Hume openlyCASSATION, AND UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. Ill
denies it. Mill does so quite as much when he makes
the relation depend upon a number of experiences,
which are of course subjective. If it expresses more
than this, if it is an objective relation between objective
facts, we at once want to know, how Mill s account of
externality, limiting it to Permanent Possibilities of
Sensation, can admit either of such an objective relation,
or of such objective facts, between which the relation
is to hold.
Let us turn to Mill s second adjective, the word
&quot;
unconditional.&quot; I suppose that there is no student
of Mill who has not felt some difficulty in understand





to be applied and used. We are told that the cause is
the sum of
&quot; the conditions,&quot; antecedent to an event : *
and yet we are told that the cause is
&quot; unconditional.&quot; f
We are told that an effect only follows a cause in the
absence of counteracting phenomena
: and yet that if
the cause is real, the effect follows
&quot; under any ima
ginable supposition with regard to other
things.&quot; {
Mill s instance of the relation of Night and Day does
not throw much light on our confusion. Day is not
the cause of night, says Mill, because Night following
on Day depends on another condition viz., the rota
tion of the earth. But inasmuch as it would appear
that the precedence of day is one of the conditions (for




bk. iii. c. v. s. 3. f Ibid., s. G. $ Ibid., s. G, par. 2.112 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
which makes a Cause the sum of conditions, must
include that precedence, in the cause of night. And
indeed it is difficult to conceive why the analysis which
resolves Causation into observed sequence, should refuse
to find in Day the cause of Night. The spirit, at
all events, of Hume s discussion seems to find it quite
a satisfactory enough instance to give of the relation
of Causation.*
The word
&quot; unconditional/ in reality, rests on a view
of the relation of mind to nature, quite different from
that which Mill unfolds in his Psychological theories.
Starting from a purely subjective basis of feeling, it is
hard, indeed, to understand its meaning: but if we
start from any realistic theory, it becomes, of course,
intelligible enough. From Mill, at all events, we are
entitled to demand this much : that either he should
refuse to speak of Cause as the sum of conditions, or
else refuse to define Cause, as the unconditional ante
cedent. He must either draw a clear distinction be
tween Cause and Condition (which he does not do) or
else abandon his adjective
&quot; unconditional.&quot;
We see, perhaps, the difficulty more clearly, when we
observe how Mill has to limit his
&quot;
unconditionally.&quot;
&quot;Unconditional&quot; just like &quot;invariable&quot; means only




&quot; under any imaginable
supposition with regard to other things,&quot; we find that
* &quot;
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the latter words only mean under any supposition with
regard to the things, which have come under our
experience. Thus in distant parts of the stellar re
gions, events may well be imagined to follow without
a cause, just as in that nebulous region 2 + 2 may=5.*
That is to say that intelligence coming across new phe
nomena may have to alter its laws. No clearer proof





&quot; mean. We surely ought to mean
by them that they hold good for all intelligence
: that
even if we do arrive at the study of phenomena in
distant stellar regions, there too we shall apply our
category of Causation just as much as we do in regions
that have come already under our study. Then
&quot; in
variable
&quot; means what it implies. But with Mill, it
only means
&quot; unvaried within the limits of our expe
rience,&quot; not absolutely invariable.








his predecessor s doctrine, are but the
darkening 6f the clear counsels of Hume. Hume we
could understand : but then Hume invalidated Science.
Mill, to save Science, adds fresh words. The relation of
Cause and Effect is still merely a subjective association,
based on past sensations, past experience
: yet the rela




tional.&quot; Hence, complexity and confusion of spirit.
* &quot;
Logic,&quot; bk. iii. c. xxi, s. 4, last par.114 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
One word, finally, as to the opinion, combated by
Mill, both in the
&quot;
Logic,&quot; Bk. iii. c. v. and the chapter
on Sir W. Hamilton the opinion, viz., that Volition is
the source and type of all our ideas of Power, and
therefore, of Causation. Mill asks, What Idea of Power
do we find in ourselves ? (much the same question as
Hume asked). Is it Power to act, or Power to will ?
If the former, there are so many steps between the
originating impulse and the consequent action so
much intermediate action of muscles, &c., of which we
are ignorant, that no idea of Power can thence be
derived.
This does not appear a wholly satisfactory criticism.
A despot, I imagine, feels a real power in giving his
orders, though he may be ignorant of the various
officials through whom his orders get executed, if he
is sure that they will be executed somehow. Some
such assurance certainly is possessed by the Will.
The second alternative that what we feel is a Power
of Self over the Volitions, or a Power to Will, Mill
disposes of without argument. Mill,
&quot; in common
with one-half the psychological world,&quot; is wholly un
conscious of having any such power. It does not
necessarily follow that the other half of the psycholo
gical world is equally unconscious. The argument,
if argument it be, is capable of too easy a retort.
But in reality, the opinion itself, that finds in . Self
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found, I need scarcely say, in Mansel and others and
not in Kant. Mansel says
*
(following in the steps of
Cousin, to whom he is largely indebted), that the soul
is a power conscious of itself. To Kant, any such
assertion would hardly commend itself. To say this of
the Soul, is to rise above Categories, is to treat the
Soul as a Noumeuon, and not, as we can only know it,
to treat it as exhibiting Phenomena. In one sense, of
course, the mere fact of a priori mental Categories






; the mere fact of its bringing a Category of
Causation to bear in the construction of an Intelligible O
World, implies a certain mental activity. But Kant
denied the Power of the individual Self over Volition
and Actions, and in that sense denied Free Will to the
Ego. On the other hand, Free Will, as shown in
Morality, is brought back again. But we are only
concerned with the Logical aspect of this question,
and from that point of view, such a notion of Power^in
the Self, is alien to the critical methods of Kant.
* &quot;
Prolegomena Logica,&quot; p. 139.
i 2CHAPTER VIII.
MATHEMATICAL AXIOMS AND NECESSARY TRUTHS.
WE proceed to the foundations of Geometry and
Arithmetic, or in other words to Mill s treatment of
Necessary Truths.
A passage in Mill s Autobiography which has been
recently quoted,* shows that with regard to these
Necessary Truths, Mill purposely chose for his con
sideration Mathematical Axioms, because thus he
thought he should carry the war into the very citadel
of the enemy. If the Axioms of Geometry were shown
to be inductions from experience, much more would
other so-called necessary truths, cease to be considered
&quot; a priori?
To this attempt, then to make Mathematical Axioms
the result of Experience, Mill devotes himself in
&quot;
Logic,&quot; Bk. II. c. v. and vi.
These chapters may be divided into three separate
questions.
* By Professor Jevons, in Contemporary Review for December,
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(i.) What is the meaning of Necessary Truth ?
(ii.) In what sense and to what extent are Mathe
matical Truths necessary ? or in other words what is




(iii.) Are Axioms Experimental Truths ?
(i.) Necessary truth as ordinarily defined, is supposed
to be that which is independent of any and every ex
perience. It is a priori truth.
Such is, however, not the sense of Necessary Truth
o Mill. Necessity to him is necessity and certainty
of Inference not certainty or necessity of truth. In
other words the term is applicable to the process of
reasoning, not to the a priori conditions of reasoning.
(&quot; The certainty ascribed is nothing whatever but
certainty of
inference.&quot;) But inference from what?
Inference from assumptions, which, by the conditions
of the enquiry are not to be questioned. This then
is Mill s definition of Necessary Truth,
&quot;
Necessary
Truth is such as necessarily follows from assumptions
which cannot be questioned.&quot; Why these assumptions
are not to be questioned, is a query to which we shall
return later.
(ii.)
&quot; The character of necessity, ascribed to the
truths of Mathematics,* and even the peculiar certainty
(sometimes) attributed to them is an
illusion,&quot; says
Mill. Why ? Because they relate to purely imaginary
objects.
&quot; There does not exist either in nature, or
* Mill s
&quot;
Logic,&quot; Bk. ii. c. 5, sec. 1.118 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
in the human mind any objects exactly corresponding








line, length without breadth,&quot; or a perfect circle.
Therefore the assumption implied in the definitions
of Geometry




Now the conclusions of Geometry follow from the
definitions, and the definitions themselves are built
upon the hypothesis that there exist real things con
formable thereto. Therefore Geometry rests upon a
hypothesis or in other words it is concerned not with
such points, circles, straight lines, as are seen in
nature ; but with ideal points, ideal circles, &c.
The same thing holds good also of the science of
number.f
&quot; In all propositions concerning numbers, a
condition is implied without which none of them would
be true, and that condition is an assumption which may
be false. The condition is that 1= 1, that all the numbers
are numbers of the same or of equal units. Let this be
doubtful, and not one of the propositions of Arith
metic will hold true.&quot; Arithmetic then, and the Science
of Numbers as well as Geometry, rest on a hypothe
sis, an assumption.
What is the conclusion ? It is stated very clearly
by Mill. I Mathematics, of course, is the type of a
* &quot; Not strictly true,&quot; ninth edition.
f
&quot;
Logic,&quot; bk. ii. c. vi., sec. 3. J Ibid., sec. 4.MATHEMATICAL AXIOMS. 119
Deductive Science, and its method rests on hypotheses.
The result is in Mill s language
&quot; that the Method of
all Deductive Sciences is hypothetical.&quot;
&quot;
They proceed
by tracing the consequences of certain assumptions,
leaving for separate consideration whether the as
sumptions are true or not, and if not exactly true,
whether they are a sufficiently near approximation to
the truth.&quot;
While elaborating his own view, Mill takes occasion
to adduce arguments against another view of Mathe
matical Necessity, viz., that of the Nominalists, who
would resolve all such necessary Truths into merely
analytical propositions.* According to them (and we
may remember that Hobbes and Leibnitz are among
them) the Definitions and Theorems of the Science of
Number are merely verbal. We are analysing what we
mean by particular terms, straight lines or units, &c.,
and we affirm no more in the predicate when we say that
two and one are three, than what we have already im
plicitly affirmed in the subject. The view is supported
by the argument that we do not carry ideas of any
particular thing along with us, when we manipulate
algebraical or arithmetical symbols, as a and x. In
answer to this, Mill asserts that we are throughout
dealing with things and not with symbols.
&quot; Ten must
mean ten bodies, or ten sounds, or ten beatings of the
pulse.&quot; The Symbols are things, and our operations
* &quot;
Logic,&quot; chap, vi sec. 2.120 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
upon them express facts. As to the other argument of
the Nominalists that the Propositions of Number, when
considered as Propositions relating to things, all seem
to be identical propositions, Mill replies that though
the subject and predicate of a numerical proposition
may have the same denotation (denoting the same
objects) yet they may have a different connotation (as
implying different states of those same objects). In
&quot; two and one three,&quot; for instance, the subject says
this
&quot; cu CD and






(iii.) We come now to the third point that Axioms
are experimental truths.*
&quot; What is the ground for
our belief in axioms what is the evidence on which
they rest ? They are experimental truths : generaliza
tions from observation.&quot; The evidence upon which we
believe them is of the same kind as the evidence upon
which we believe any other fact of external nature
our experience of their truth. They are the simplest
and easiest cases of generalization from experience.
In order to support this view, Mill has to undertake
two tasks.
i. He has to show that the evidence derived from
experience is sufficient to prove axioms.
This he does by pointing out how experience con
firms them every moment in our lives. Experimental
proofs crowd upon us in profusion without any instance
* &quot;
Logic,&quot; chap. v. sec. 4.MATHEMATICAL AXIOMS. 121
of a possible exception. If then experience is sufficient
to convince us of their truth, why should we be at
the pains of supposing other
6t a priori&quot; evidence
necessary ?
ii. In the next place, he has to defend his theory
against attacks.
(a.)
&quot; Axioms are seen to be true by merely thinking
of them, not by actual experiment of seeing and feel
ing.&quot; But, says Mill, Imagination can so reproduce
sensations of form that our mental pictures of lines,
circles, &c., are as fit subjects for experimentation,
as the realities.
(ft.)
&quot; The axioms contain an assertion of invaria
bility and universality, e.g., one axiom says, two
straight lines cannot meet if prolonged to infinity.
How is this to be explained by an experience which
can never talk of an infinite distance?&quot; Mill answers :
that we know that, if the two straight lines would
meet, they would meet at a finite distance, and we can
in imagination transport ourselves to that point, and
there in imagination discover that the two convergent
lines are not straight lines, but crooked ones. Imagi
nation, and its power to reproduce sensations of form,
help us over this difficulty.
(y.)
&quot; But the contradictory of these axiomatic truths
is inconceivable.&quot; Mill replies, that what is inconceiv
able is neither necessarily, nor always false. For
inconceivability is altogether an accidental thing, or as122 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
Mill puts it,
&quot; Both what persons can and what they
cannot conceive is very much an affair of accident, and
depends altogether on their experience and their habits
of thought.&quot; If we have in past experience frequently
and constantly found a Proposition true, we believe its
contradictory to be inconceivable. If, on the contrary,
we have ever found it false, or if there exist analogies
which suggest the possibility of its ever being false,
then its contradictory becomes conceivable.
Moreover, we have several examples of Propositions
once regarded as inconceivable, now recognised not
merely as conceivable but as being the only true
accounts.* E.g., to Newton, that a body should act
where it is not, was inconceivable; now it is recognised,
says Mill, in the theory of Gravitation and Magnetism.
And on the other hand, we have instances of truths
really arrived at by long experience and investigation,
which have become so familiar, that some scientific
men hold them to be necessary truths, e.g., the first
law of motion (which by some is held to be a neces
sary truth), and the laws of chemical composition.
So the test of inconceivableness proves nothing,
except that
&quot; two ideas are so firmly associated in
our minds that we find it impossible to disconnect
them.&quot;
Hence the general result follows that axioms are
experimental truths.
* &quot;
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In examining Mill s doctrines on the subject of
Mathematics and Necessary Truths, there are two parts
of the subject which we had better keep distinct. The
first is expressed in the question
:
(1.) How far is Mill s own account of Mathe
matics and Geometry satisfactory and
consistent with itself?
The second will run thus :
(2.) Can we believe that Necessity and Univer
sality are to be gained by the Association of
Ideas, or, to put it differently, does Mill
satisfactorily dispose of the test of In
conceivability of the opposite ?
I. Let us first clearly see the difference between
Mill and Hume in respect of Mathematical truths.
With Hume,* all lines, angles, triangles, and figures
with which the Geometrician is conversant, were f
nothing other than those which we have come across
&amp;gt;
in our experience. Consequently Hume can only allow
the mathematician an indefinite approach to exactness. .
It is all very well for the mathematician to pronounce
all right angles equal, but any perfect equality an
equality
&quot;
beyond what we have instruments and art
to ascertain,&quot; Hume says is
&quot; a mere fiction of the
mind, useless as well as incomprehensible.&quot; From
the progressive correction of our actual measurements
we have a tendency to feign perfect exactness, perfect
* Hume s
&quot;
Treatise,&quot; part ii. sec. 4.124 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
equality in these cases, but it is nothing else than a
fiction. In perfect consistency with this we find
Hume denying the infinite divisibility of extension.
1 And throughout Hume s spirit is the same, as indeed
(it
must be for any philosopher, who makes all truths
(and therefore all Mathematical truths) rest on
experience.
But just as Hume s doctrine of Cause was supposed
to invalidate the possibility or truth of Natural Science,




very different from what the
mathematician himself assumes. And just as Mill
made some additions to Hume s doctrine of Causation
to save Physics, so too he adds to his predecessor s
doctrine of Geometry to save Mathematical Science.
The addition is this : that mathematical deductions
depend on a hypothesis. We suppose, according to
Mill, figures exactly corresponding to our definitions,
though such do not really exist. The definitions, in
fact, represent ideas, though not ideas to which real
objects can be found exactly answering. The lines,
angles, and figures are ideal lines, angles, and figures.
With Hume, on the contrary, all ideas were merely
copies of impressions, and therefore our idea of a line
could only be a copy of our impression of a line.
This hypothetical character of Mathematics Mill
derived from Dugald Stewart, and it is a refinement on
Hume. Is this refinement an improvement ?MATHEMATICAL AXIOMS. 125
It is and it is not. We welcome with satisfaction
the admission that there can be in the mind ideas,
which are not copies of sensible things ideas to which
no external counterpart can exactly be found. We are
glad to learn that the mind can manipulate ideal figures,
and reason about them, and draw deductions from them
quite apart from the external (so-called) realities,
with which we are conversant in experience.
But then, what becomes of the assertion in the
&quot;Logic,&quot; that the theory
&quot; that knowledge consists in
the agreement or disagreement of ideas, is the most
fatal mistake that ever retarded a scientific observer
&quot;
?
Knowledge deals with things, not with our ideas of
things, says Mill. But Mathematical Knowledge,
ai&amp;gt;
all events, seems to deal with our ideas of things, and
not with things, with our ideas of straight lines, and
not with straight lines, such as we meet with in expe
rience. It is perhaps a little superfluous of Mill to
say that ten means ten things, ten beats of the pulse,
ten counters, &c., after this admission.
And further, what have we heard of the mind
hitherto, in Mill s system, which will account for this
idealising power? The mind is only the permanent
possibility of undergoing sensations. Sensations, and
associations of sensations and ideas, give us the sum
total of our mental furniture on the intellectual side.
How then can the mind give us ideal lines, such as do
not correspond with what Mill calls external realities ?126 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
How can it have ideas to which no external objects
can be found answering ? Of course Mill treats the
idealising power as an illusion. But just as Hurne
might be called upon to account for his
&quot;
tendency to
feign,&quot; of which he makes such conspicuous use, so
Mill may be called upon to account for this idealising
power, this power of framing hypothetical straight
lines, which he uses in accounting for mathematical
truth.
The real difficulty emerges later. The difficulty is
to bring into harmony this hypothetical character of
definitions, and the other doctrine that axioms are
nothing but experimental truths. For if
&quot; two straight
lines cannot enclose a space&quot; be a truth known only by
experience, when we talk about straight lines we can
only mean such straight lines as are known in expe
rience. If, on the other hand, the straight lines we
talk about, are not straight lines known in experience,
but ideal straight lines, the axiom in question cannot
be learnt from experience, because experience never
testifies to it, never presenting us with lines really
straight
Either, then, the ideal straight line must be an exact
copy of a real straight line, or else axioms are not
founded on Experience. Which is Mill s opinion ? It
is impossible to say. Is our mental image an exact
copy of a reality, or is it not ? In the first section of
chapter v. he says,
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magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly
straight ; no circles with all their radii exactly equal,
nor squares with all their angles perfectly right.
Their existence, so far as we can form any judgment,
would seem to be inconsistent with the physical con
stitution of our planet at least, if not of the universe.&quot;
In the fifth section he says,
&quot; The imaginary lines
exactly resemble real
ones,&quot; and again, &quot;We can
frame a mental image, which we may rely on as being
precisely similar to the
reality.&quot;*
II. We proceed to Mill s treatment of the test of
Inconceivability.
The question now is this : Are the recognised tests
of such Truths as the first truths of Mathematics (and
indeed all truths of the same stringency) viz., Neces
sity and Universality, sufficiently accounted for by the
laws of Association ? The easiest mode of approaching
this question is to look at that test which is the




* I need not enlarge on this point, as it was strenuously insisted
on by Professor Stanley Jevons in his article in the Contemporary
Review for December, 1877. His summing up of Mill s position is
clear, and is adequately supported by his references.
1. Perfectly straight lines do not really exist.
2. We experiment upon imaginary straight lines.
3. These imaginary straight lines exactly resemble the real ones.
4. If these imaginary straight lines are not perfectly straight,
they will not enable us to prove the truths of Geometry.
5. If they are perfectly straight, then the real ones which exactly
resemble them must be perfectly straight, ergo, perfectly
straight Hues do exist.128 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
versality&quot; viz.,
&quot; the Inconceivability of the Opposite
Assumption.&quot; The first truths of Mathematics are
Necessary and Universal, because the opposite assump
tion is inconceivable, because we cannot even conceive
the possibility of straight lines ever enclosing a space.
Mill says that Inconceivability is an accidental
thing, depending on experience, and association of
ideas.* Inconceivability is of course an ambiguous
term, and before we can assent to this, we have to see
in what senses it is capable of being used. Fortunately
Mill himself helps us here. In his chapter on &quot;The
Philosophy of the Conditioned
&quot; in u The Examination
of Hamilton
&quot; he distinguishes three senses of the
word.
Inconceivable means
(a) that of which the mind can form no repre
sentation, either because no attributes are
given out of which a representation could
be framed, or because the attributes given
are incompatible.
(/3) that of which, though the mind can form a
representation, it cannot conceive a reali
sation. In this sense the mind is, by the
law of association, temporarily debarred
from believing it.
(y) that, which the mind cannot construe to itself,
through a higher notion, or conceive as the
*
&quot;
Logic,&quot; bk. iii. c. v. s. 9.MATHEMATICAL AXIOMS. 129
consequent of a certain reason. This is a
Hamiltonian sense of the word, which
would render all first truths inconceivable,
and must therefore be rejected.*
If a thing, continues Mill, is inconceivable in the
third sense, it can, obviously, be believed with full
understanding. If it is inconceivable in the second
sense, it can yet be believed, because we can represent
it to ourselves, and
&quot; the inability to conceive
&quot;
only
rests upon a limited experience. If it is inconceivable
in the first sense,
(a) if we can attach any meaning to it, it may be
believed, but without understanding - i.e..
it may be believed, because if false it would
contradict something which is otherwise
known to be true, or it may be taken on
Authority; but
(ft) if we cannot attach any meaning to it at all,
belief is impossible.
Now, in which of these senses, is it inconceivable
that two straight lines should enclose a space ? Evi
dently in the first sense, the attributes given are
incompatible straightness does not accord with the
enclosure of space. In the second sense of the term,
the Antipodes were inconceivable to our forefathers.
They could indeed form a picture of them, but they
were debarred from believing in them because all ex-
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; pp. 83-89.130 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
perience hitherto had pointed in an opposite direction.
Here possibly the association of Ideas generated by
experience is quite adequate to explain the incon
ceivability. Is it sufficient to explain inconceivability
in the first sense, where inconceivable=unpicturable ;
or where, in other words, it seems to go clean against
the forms of the thinking mind itself? Mill says it
is.* &quot;We cannot conceive two straight lines as
enclosing a space, because enclosing a space means
approaching and meeting a second time ; and the
mental image of two straight lines which have once
met, is inseparably associated with the representation
of them as diverging.&quot; And again,f
&quot;We should
probably have no difficulty in putting together the two
ideas supposed to be incompatible, if our experience
had not first inseparably associated one of them with
the contradictory of the other.&quot;
This is, of course, simply an assertion, not even
adequately supported by instances, for the instances
come mainly from the second sense of the term incon
ceivable. It is therefore certainly incumbent upon us
to examine it somewhat further.
In the first place,
it is to be noticed, that not only
is the common consciousness of mankind opposed to




inconceivability of the opposite,&quot; but also philo
sophers. Leibnitz and Hobbes, for instance, despairing
*




&quot; and &quot;universality&quot; out of a
synthesis of experiences, attempt to get them out of
an analysis of consciousness. According to this theory,
the axioms (and all Necessary Truth), are merely Ana
lytic judgments, we are merely analysing what we
mean by the name. But Mill expressly rejects this
view. With him, Axioms are synthetic, i.e., more is
expressed in the predicate than is stated in the sub
ject, and yet, propositions which add to our knowledge
(synthetic) attain to universality and necessity by
adding experience to experience.
Kant simply falls back on these tests, as all suffi
cient ; where we have synthetic judgments, as these
axioms are, and yet judgments which are necessary and
universal, there we may be sure, according to Kant, of
&quot; a priori
&quot;
action of the mind.
Even Herbert Spencer* opposes Mill on this point.
With him, the inconceivability of the contradictory is
the ultimate basis of all beliefs. It is the universal
postulate.
&quot; Whenever the contradictory of a Propo
sition is inconceivable, that-Proposition must be accepted
as true.&quot; Being then the final ground of all our be
liefs, intuitive as well as inferential, it must be that
of axioms among the rest.
Let us approach this question from another side.
* H. Spencer s
&quot;
Psychology,&quot; vol. ii., p. 40C and following. So
too G. H. Lewes,
&quot;
History of Philosophy,&quot; Introduction
&quot; The Test
of Truth.&quot;132 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
According to Mill, the necessity and universality of
axioms are due to an inseparable association of ideas in
experience. Evidently, unless the Association is inse
parable, Experience cannot generate universality and
necessity. Now, does experience testify to the truth of
these axioms so constantly as to be able to produce
inseparable associations ? Why they are contradicted,
so far as experience goes, constantly, and as a frequent
matter of observation.
&quot;
Every child who looks down
a long street, sees two parallel right lines converging.
Every one who puts a straight rule into water, may
observe that a crooked line is the shortest way between
two points (its extremities).&quot;* What is the mental
process in such cases ? We believe in our axioms even
-when experience contradicts them, as against and in
the teeth of experience. Mill s own illustration of
railway lines which seem to meet is an instance in
point.
It may be said, that in these cases, we correct one
experience by another, but that throughout we never
leave the field of experience. But the question is,
how inseparable associations are formed, and Mill tells
us that unless experience is invariable, no inseparable
association can be formed.
&quot; Uniformities of sequence
in which the phenomena succeed one another only at a
certain interval, do not give rise to inseparable asso
ciations.&quot; And again,
&quot; Had but experience afforded
* Cf. Mahaffy s
&quot; Fischer on Kant.&quot; Introduction, p. xxvii.MATHEMATICAL AXIOMS. 133
an illusion, the counter-association formed might have
been sufficient to render the reverse supposition pos
sible.&quot; But here, experience does afford illusions,
therefore inseparable associations cannot be formed.
Therefore experience cannot lead up to Necessity
and Universality and Inconceivability of the Opposite.
The fact is, as it seems to me, that whether we
compare these rigid tests with the associations which
experience generates, or whether taking experience,
we see whether it is invariable enough to produce
inseparable association from both points of view,
Necessary Truth remains as an unique testimony to a
priori mental action, depending on mental forms, in
dependent of all experience, and therefore never itself
to be developed out of experience.CHAPTER IX.
GENERAL IDEAS.
WE come now to a subject which brings us to the
borderland of Logic that of the formation of General
Ideas.
Mill s view on this question is to be gathered from
(1.) Examination of Hamilton, c. xvii.
&quot; On
General Concepts.&quot;
(2.) Logic. Bk. iv., c. ii., &quot;On Abstraction, or
the Formation of Conceptions.&quot;
The last chapter may be dismissed after a very few
words. It is concerned only with abstraction, as a
Logical process, as a process subsidary to Induction.
One pertinent criticism of Whewell may be noticed.
Whewell had maintained that the conception, first
formed in the mind, was superinduced upon pheno
mena. Mill asserts that it is only gained from
phenomena. General concepts are always gained by
abstraction from individual objects, whether those
individual objects be the very things we are examining,
or whether they be things whose resemblances weGENERAL IDEAS. 135
remember to have noted on former occasions, which
we bring in to help out our present investigation.
The metaphysical question, how concepts are formed
at all, or whether we ought to speak of General Ideas,
or only of General Names, Mill does not discuss in
the Logic. To discover this we have to turn to the
chapter in
&quot; the Examination.&quot;
As however this question of General Ideas has a
history we had better trace its origin farther back,
and let Mill s ,opinion, as divulged in this chapter, fall
into its proper historical position, as that of a modern
Nominalist
To the Greeks, the possibility of knowledge rested
in large measure on the existence of Universals or
General Ideas. This was the direct outcome of, and
reaction against, the Sceptical tendencies of Sophistic
thought, with the stress it laid on individualism indi
vidualism in Logic, Ethics, and Life. To Socrates the
only safeguard for knowledge was the recognition of
universal concepts, true for all intelligence and not
varying with the variability of individuals. And so it
is Socrates praise in the mouth of Aristotle, that he
insisted on the importance, not only of eTTa/m/cot \6you
but also of TO bpi&vQai KaOokov, that he invented a
philosophy of Conceptualism. After him the artistic
Hellenic feeling that for every mental idea there must
be found an external counterpart, gained free play. If
there are General Ideas in the mind there must be136 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
general things or Substantive Ideas in the Universe. If
there are subjective iSeat, arrived at by a process of
; comparison and division, by fwaycoyr/ and 6icupeo-is,
there are also objective
t8eai, existing for Plato in
the only real sense of
&quot;
existence,&quot; in an intelligible
world. Illustrated and explained in every variety of
;
: dialectical exegesis throughout all the Platonic dia
logues, nowhere do the tbeai stand out in such complete
objective presentation as in the Republic. But not
only are these universals objective and real, but they
are the only reality: single, particular, individual
objects fade into all the transitoriness and nothingness
of the (})aLv6[jivov. This was the extreme expression of
what was known afterwards as Realism, or the doctrine
of
&quot; Universalia ante rem or extra rem.&quot;
The poetry of such a conception survived in the
Middle Ages, although the practical exigencies of
Logic demanded its demolition at the hands of
Aristotle. But Aristotle was too much of a Platonist
to destroy it utterly. In his controversial moods he
says, sternly enough, that such Universals were a need
less reduplication of sensible things, were practically
useless, and untrue ; and then, in his meditative moods,
he tells us, as in the Posterior Analytics, that though
the individual object be the only thing perceived, yet
the object of the perception is not the individual Callias,
but the universal man. The only reality is affirmed to
be the Hoc Aliquid, the particular sensible thing, andGENEKAL IDEAS. 137
the Universal only the predicate of the ro5e n : and
(
yetall the apyal on which cTricr?//^, or Science, depends
are Generals and Universals, Summa Genera, attainable
only by vovs. , The solution of the antithesis is per
haps to be found in the sentence tv rols ciSeo-i rots
ala-Otfrois tvto-TL 77cos TO, I orjTo,. Nous is implicit in, may
be developed from aio-flrjo-is.* And so of Aristotle s
doctrine, on this subject, the sum is that he supposed
Universalia, not
&quot; extra rein&quot; as Plato did, but &quot;in
re.&quot;
It was natural, perhaps, that Medievalism, with its
poetry, its constructive imagination, its scientific im
potence, should remember the &quot;Universalia,&quot; and forget
the
&quot; in re.&quot; The doctrines of Realism,f at all events,
flourished in the Schools, and Scholasticism, hand in
hand with Theology, affirmed by the mouths ofAnselm,
Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, the existence of Universals
in nature, as realities, apart from and greater than
individual realities.
The reaction came in the rise of Nominalism. These
Universalia were not
&quot; ante rem,&quot; or
&quot; in
re,&quot; but mere
&quot;nomina,&quot; &quot;names&quot; applied for our convenience, hold
ing together a mass ofparticulars solely by the strength
of the common name applied. They are voces, said
*
Arist., De An. iii.
f I need scarcely say that
&quot; Realism
&quot;
in this sense is different from
the sense in which I have used it as applicable to the doctrines of
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Roscellin. They are sermones, said Abelard. They are
only
&quot; in mente,&quot; said William of Ockham.
&quot; Entia
non multiplicanda sunt preeter necessitatem.&quot; Logic,
Science, the Modern Spirit were all on the side of the
Nominalists, and Realism fell.
It left not itself without witness, however, in the
modern world, in the doctrines of so-called Con-
ceptualism. But, though the inheritor of Realism, the
whole point of view is changed. For
&quot; Universalia
&quot;
in Nature being denied and discredited, the modern
question became, not whether there are or are
not in Nature essences and quiddities, but rather
what is the process of the acquisition of knowledge ?
Are these General Ideas in the Mind abstracted from
particulars of Sense-perception ? Or is it truer to say
that, after observation of phenomena, we choose to
apply not General Ideas, but merely General Names ?
If a. b. c. be observed singly and separately, is the abc
with which we sum up the result, a general idea formed
in the mind, or a general name formed, as convenience
suggests, by dropping out individual peculiarities?
Thus the modern contest of Conceptualism and Nomi
nalism is waged round the origin and process of
Knowledge, while the anciest contest of Realism and
Nominalism was waged round the constitution of the
external world. Descartes and the Cartesians are
Conceptualists ; Hobbes is a Nominalist ; Locke is a
Nominalist in tendency and a Conceptualist in expres-GENEEAL IDEAS. 139
sion
(&quot; words become general by being made the signs
of general ideas.&quot;)* Berkeley and Hume are both
claimed as Nominalists, Reid and Hamilton are, for
all practical purposes, Conceptualists.





is a criticism on Hamil
ton s position in this question. Hamilton, somewhat
infelicitously, attempted to combine the doctrines of
Conceptualism and Nominalism. He is, in reality,
says Mill, a Conceptualist, yet he quotes with appro
bation Berkeley s words in the
&quot;
Principles,&quot; in which
that philosopher confesses that if others have
&quot; this
wonderful power of abstracting their ideas,&quot; they best
can tell, but for himself he has no such power.
There are two arguments by which Hamilton defends
the possibility of General Concepts.
(i.) General Concepts are objects of the Thinking
Faculty (Begriff), not objects of the Imagining
Faculty (Anschauuug). If we had only the Imagin
ing Faculty we should never get beyond a series of
individuals and particulars ; by the aid of the Think
ing Faculty we gain General Concepts. Thus though
Imagination cannot figure to itself anything general
or universal, Thought Proper, or the Comparative
Faculty, or the Understanding, can.
This Mill denies. The distinction is one, he thinks,
which would not be admitted by Berkeley, or any of
* &quot;
Essay,&quot; bk. iii. c. iii.140 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
the great Nominalist thinkers, any more than it would
be by himself.
(ii.) The second argument is that a Concept is really
a mental relation between individual things. Though
things be individual, the relation can be general or
universal. Mill replies that a relation must mean a
relation between things
: and if the things are in
dividual, so is the relation. It follows, too, that a
relation cannot be thought without thinking the re
lated objects, and the related objects being thought as
individual, the relation itself is thought as individual.
After these criticisms on Hamilton, Mill states his
own position, the usual Nominalist doctrine. It is
this * &quot; The formation of a Concept does not consist
in separating the attributes which are said to compose
it, from all other attributes of the same object, and
enabling us to conceive those attributes, disjoined from
any others. We neither conceive them nor think
them, or cognise them in any way as a thing apart,
but solely as forming the idea of an individual object.&quot;
Genera] Concepts, therefore, we have, properly, none ;
we have only complex ideas of objects in the concrete ;
we are only thinking of individual objects, but we can
attend exclusively to some part of the concrete idea.
And what enables us to do this is the employment of
Signs and especially of Names.
There are one or two criticisms which might be
* &quot;
Examination,&quot; p. 377.GENERAL IDEAS. 141
made on the way in which Mill treats Hamilton. In
the first place, Mill quotes from Berkeley s
&quot; Intro
duction to Principles of Human Knowledge,&quot; the
section 10 which is generally quoted so far as it goes
a very clear enunciation of a Nominalist position. But
another section (section 15) introduces a point of view





volving a symbolical relation to other
things.&quot;
&quot; Uni
versality does not consist in the absolute positive
nature of anything but in the relation it bears to the
particulars signified or represented by it: by virtue
whereof things particular are rendered universal.&quot; It
is clear then that to Berkeley
&quot;
ideas&quot; in themselves
particular are universalised by their relations, the
apprehension of relations being the essence of general
knowledge. If such is Berkeley s position, it is obvious
that he is not a Nominalist in the sense in which Mill
takes him to be. Such a position as is disclosed in
the sentences given above explains, in reality, what
Hamilton was aiming at, in describing General Ideas
as relations.
Mill s criticism on the doctrine, which resolves
General Ideas into relations, shows clearly how little he
attempted to realise what Hamilton (and Berkeley
before him) had meant by the word
&quot;
relation.&quot; If &quot;re
lation&quot; only means a link connecting two things, it is
possible that if the things are particular and individual,142 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
the link may be particular and individual also. But
&quot; relation
&quot; does not only mean
&quot; link of connection :
&quot;
it means &quot;aspects,&quot; &quot;ways&quot; of regarding things.
&quot; Relations established between things,&quot; means the
things grasped and held together by a conception or
conceptions. Relation is only another way of speak
ing of
&quot; mental forms.&quot; If this is the meaning which
Hamilton gave (or intended to give) to the word, the
criticism of Mill does not hit the point at all. How
ever particular and individual the things may be, the
view, the aspect in which they are regarded is not
individual and particular. The mental form, the
mould, as it were, in which the things are run, is on
the contrary necessarily general and universal. Objects,
as Berkeley seems to have thought, in themselves par
ticular, are universalised by their relations.
This too explains what Hamilton meant by that
&quot;potential generality&quot; or &quot;universality&quot; of certain
things, of which Mill is so incredulous. It is exactly
what Berkeley said when he spoke of things involving
a symbolical relation to other things. All that is meant
is that a triangle may be taken to stand for any and
every triangle ; we may reason about it, draw deduc
tions from it, applicable to all triangles, with perfect
truth. Why? Because the triangle is potentially,
though not actually, universal. Because the particular
triangle
&quot;doth equally stand for and represent all recti
lineal triangles whatever.&quot;GENEEAL IDEAS. 143
And finally we see now Hamilton s distinction be






in reference to this question, though,
by a verbal slip, he, as Mill points out, afterwards con
founds the two. A particular individual triangle is a
matter for the Imaginative faculty, the Anschauung to
present. It must be a triangle of some one kind, either
scalene, or isosceles, or equiangular. The potential
universality of that triangle, its symbolical relation
to all other triangles, cannot be presented by the
Imaginative faculty. It is a matter for thought, for
Begriff. Or in other words, that conception of rela
tions, which is the essence of knowledge, is the work
of something higher than Sense or Imagination or any
purely Presentative faculty ; it is the work of Mind or
Thought, imposing its own forms on the chaotic mate
rials of Sense.
The real elucidation of the question of Conceptualism
or Nominalism is not reached, until we answer the pre
liminary question, What is the course or progress of
acquiring Knowledge? Does Knowledge proceed from
the Abstract to the Concrete, or from the Concrete to
the Abstract ?
Locke, Hume, Mill and all Nominalists assume that
the last is the true answer. First individual, concrete,
objects, then abstractions from these, in so called
ideas. From this point of view, of course, the ideas,
being mere copies of things, cannot contain more than144 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
the things from which they are derived. There cannot,
for instance, be ideas really general or universal, because
this would be to add something, not accounted for by
the particular, individual things of which they are the
copies. Hence the Nominalist doctrine that whatever
generality or universality we have or seem to have in
our ideas, is a mere generality or universality of Name.
Knowledge is from Concrete to Abstract, and concrete
things being individual, the abstract ideas are in reality
merely individual also.
Take the other assumption and the question must be
differently answered. For now the assumption is that
the course of knowledge is from Abstract to Concrete ;
that in the first stages we have vague generalities,
indefinite and undefined relations, and that the develop
ment of knowledge, by Comparison, by the exercise of the
Comparative or Rational faculty, leads to the increas
ing definiteness of these early and vague specifications
until is reached the Concrete Individual Thing. For
an Individual Thing, a Concrete thing, is, in reality,
very complex and by no means simple, or immediately
cognised. A Concrete Individual Thing has a mass of
CD
relations with other things, which keep it in its Indi
viduality, relating it to, differentiating it from, all
other things. It cannot therefore be an early product
of knowledge. First there is the chaos of Sense-
impressions into which the Mind brings order, by
imposing forms and relations and categories. ThenGENERAL IDEAS. 145
from the action and re-action of Sense-impressions
and Thought-relation, arises the definite Individual
Thing. The course of knowledge is from Abstract to
Concrete.
Let us apply this to the case before us. Let us
take any general Proposition. Every triangle has its
three interior angles equal to two right angles. This
general proposition is based, we say, on the general idea
of a triangle. How has this general proposition




&quot; * of our general idea of a triangle. Our
idea of a triangle is due to
&quot; the unconscious synthesis
of Perception.&quot; The Perception of a triangle is the
result of certain relations being imposed on sense-
impressions. These relations are imposed almost un
consciously, the normal process in perception being
in all cases alike. The general proposition then is
the result of an analysis in reflection of that synthesis,
or imposing of relations, which goes on unconsciously
in perception.
First knowledge is abstract, then it is concrete ; first
it is an undigested mass of general relations, then it is
definite individualisation. First there is the general
abstract idea of a triangle ; then (and only in the
second place) there is the special individual triangle
whether scalene or isosceles or equiangular. When after
all this process is concluded (almost unconsciously) we
* Cf. Professor Green s
&quot; Introduction to Hume, p. 183.
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make a general proposition and enquire on what it rests,
and what account we are to give of it, we answer that
it is due to reflective analysis reflection analysing the
general relations imposed when knowledge was in its
abstract stage.
To ask then, are General Ideas possible ? is a need
less question. For general ideas are of course abstract
ideas : and knowledge is abstract before it becomes
individual and concrete. To make General Ideas
merely individual ideas, with some specific properties
dropped out, is to confuse the later stages of know
ledge with the earlier : to make the course of knowledge
proceed from the Concrete to the Abstract, instead of
(as it really does) from the Abstract to the Concrete.
If all this be so, we can see how it acts upon the
Theory of Syllogistic reasoning. For the Theory of
the Syllogism is really an answer to the question,
what is the place of General Ideas in reasoning? Mill,
consistently with his views of General Ideas, has to
deny to the Major Premiss any logical merit as that
from which the conclusion is proved. The conclusion
does not follow from the Major Premiss, according to
Mill. The Major Premiss is but a register, a memo
randum of that, to which experience has testified
hitherto. When we say,
&quot; Ail men are mortal, Socrates
is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal,&quot; the conclusion
does not follow from the assertion that all men are
mortal, but that assertion is proved concurrently withGENEKAL IDEAS. 147
the conclusion, by the course of experience. Mill could
not say otherwise. As there are no General Ideas,
knowledge must of course be a course of inference from
Particular to Particular. But if there are, after all,
General Ideas, as the Conceptualist imagines, it is a
different thing. Then the Major Premiss becomes
something more than a mere register, a memorandum.
To it in a very real sense is due the conclusion. The
&quot;
mortality
&quot; which we now formally predicate ofman is
the recognition by reflective analysis of those early
relations, by which we made real and intelligible to
ourselves our conceptions of humankind.CHAPTER X.
EPILOGUE.
WITH the questions of
&quot;
Necessary Truth,&quot; and
&quot; General Concepts,&quot; an inquiry into the metaphysical
foundations of Mill s Philosophy necessarily ends. The




have not the power or the wish to criticise. It is, in
fact, part of the contention of the foregoing pages, that
the logical doctrines stand on a different basis, as
compared with the psychological doctrines revealed
whether in criticisms of Hamilton, or expositions of
James Mill. Nor is it possible for me to discuss that
gravest of metaphysical questions, which forms the
subject of Mill s posthumous volume on Nature and
Religion. Two remarks may be ventured on. In the
first place, it is not hard to discover in Mill s views as to
God the result of those radical defects of Sensationalism,
which are to be found in other parts of his philosophical
scheme. It would be difficult, indeed, for Sensationalism,
with its two dogmas of the supremacy of the Individual,
and the supremacy of Sensation, to arrive at any suchEPILOGUE. 149
conceptions of the Absolute, and the Infinite, and the
Super-sensual, as are implied in the philosophical (and
popular) belief in the great First Cause. The attempt
has twice been made by English Sensationalists, and
the result has not been encouraging. In Locke,* the in
consistency of a quasi-materialism on the one side, and
a proof of God, which rests on the existence of Spirit,
on the other, is too obvious and apparent
: and
Berkeley s proof of God,f makes the conception rest on
just those
&quot;
presuppositions of Faith,&quot; on which, in
reality, is based his doctrine of Mind or Spirit. Hume,
with his clear-headed logic, and directness of vision,
knew too well the limits of the sensationalistic system.
The other remark is, that Mill s view of Nature
in which the absence of all feeling of the beauty of the
Natural World is so significant a feature is perhaps
explained by the deficiency of any systematic treat
ment of the Emotions, which is a peculiar charac
teristic of nearly all the so-called English Psychological
School, with the exception of Bain. In Mill s own case,
the complete subjection of his own mind in its earlier
stages to that of his father (from which it comes that
Mill has no Psychology of his own at all, but only an
adapted version of the
&quot;
Analysis
&quot; of James Mill), and
the peculiar suppression of emotional culture, which his
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Principles of Human Knowledge,&quot; sec. 98.150 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
points, as well in his Philosophy, as in his Life.
&quot; The Autobiography
&quot; should be read side by side with
the
(i Three Essays on Religion.&quot;*
To speak of systems of Philosophy as
&quot;
transitional,&quot;
is the easy and possibly the historical method, when
they include some curious inconsistencies. If such a
method may be employed here, Mill s system may justly
be termed
&quot;
transitional.&quot; Sensationalism is the early
phase of English philosophy, Scientific Empiricism is
the later. The difference is exactly measured by the
rise and study of Biology. Sensationalism is empiri
cism minus Biology ; scientific empiricism is empiri
cism plus Biology. Hume forms the apex, as it
were, of the early phase ; the later phase reaches its
culmination in works like G. H. Lewes
&quot; Problems of
Life and Mind,&quot; and the
&quot;
Physical Basis of Mind.&quot;
Mill stands between the earlier and the later, he is
not a pure Sensationalist, and he is not a scientific
Empiricist. And so, if we judge him by an absolute
standard, he is doubly wrong, wrong from the point
of view of the earlier philosophers, and wrong from the
point of view of the later. But if we view him
historically, according to a relative standard, he becomes
a true and valuable link of connection showing how
sensationalism merges itself into a scientific empiricism.
His work is, in fact,
&quot;
transitional.&quot;
* Cf. Autobiography, p. 148.
&quot; I wanted a culture of the emotions.&quot;
Cf. however, p. 1-47.EPILOGUE. 151
Many indications may be found in his philosophy,
which yield this result, besides some of those we have
been in past pages considering. The characteristic
principle of Sensationalism is the passivity of Sense,
the passivity of Mind, and thence comes all the diffi
culty of understanding how a purely receptive and pas
sive mind can &quot;relate&quot; one feeling to another, can
differentiate and discriminate different sensations, can
associate one with another. Biology has radically
altered the problem. For now, instead of
&quot; a passive
receptivity of sense,&quot; we hear of
&quot; a nervous organisa
tion,&quot; which is active ; we hear of an organic classifica
tion of relations, whereby the perceptions of difference
and similarity are the first constituents of conscious
ness. &quot;To rest with the unqualified assertion,&quot; says
Herbert Spencer,
&quot; that antecedent to experience, the
mind is a blank, is to ignore the questions Whence
conies the power of organising experiences ? If at
birth there exists nothing but a passive receptivity of
impressions, why is not a horse as educable as a man ?
Understood in its current form, the experience-h}
r
po-
thesis implies that the presence ofa definitely-organised
nervous system is a circumstance of no moment a
fact, not needing to be taken into account ! Yet it is the
all-important fact the fact to which, in one sense, the
criticisms of Leibnitz and others pointed the fact,
without which such an assimilation of experiences is152 THE METAPHYSICS OP MILL.
inexplicable.&quot;
* And Lewes, too, is equally clear on
this point. He discriminates between
&quot; sensation
properly so-called,&quot; and what he terms
&quot;
ideation&quot; (or
the faculty of having ideas), and he pertinently asks
&quot; If the mind is
* a tabula rasa as to knowledge, and
is not even pre-existent as a faculty (according to the
metaphysicians) or as organism (according to the
biologists), if, in a word, sensations and combinations
of sensations create both knowledge and the knowing
faculties, how can we explain the phenomena of
idiocy ?
&quot;
( Compared with this empirical development,
Mill s psychological criticisms of Hamilton are some
what antiquated. Hear him in a later work, standing
before Mr. Bain s psychological labours and comment
ing on what to him is a new revelation. a Those
who have studied the writings of the Association
Psychologists, must have often been unfavourably
impressed by the almost total absence, in their
analytical expositions, of the recognition of any active
clement, as spontaneity, in the mind itself.&quot; J
Besides the direct contribution of Biology to Psy
chology in the shape of a
&quot;
definitely-constituted
nervous organism,&quot; there is also the indirect result of
the study of Heredity.
&quot;
Hereditary transmission,&quot;
with all that it entails, is perhaps the most conspicuous
* H. Spencer s
&quot;





History of Philosophy.&quot; vol. ii.
J Mill s
&quot; Dissertations and Discussions,&quot; vol. iii., art. on
&quot;
Bain.&quot;EPILOGUE. 153
principle of modern scientific empiricism. It is this
which explains, or is believed to explain, the long-
debated question of
&quot; Mental Forms,&quot; and reconciles,
as Mr. Herbert Spencer says in
&quot; First Principles,&quot;
the school of Kant with the school of Locke, and allows




&quot; of Forms is shown to be a
mere logical priority, the explanation being that they
have been developed by a long course of experiences in
the race. In other words, in these and kindred
problems the great conception of Historical Evolution
plays an important part. But Mill, as we have before
noticed, is strangely uninfluenced by the importance of
Evolution in Psychology. In this matter, he is still a
Sensationalist, still clings to the individual experience
of Locke and Berkeley and Hume, instead of the
universal Race-experience of Herbert Spencer and
Lewes. Very noteworthy, from this point of view, is
his admiration of Comte s historical law of Progress ;
his surprise at the daring generalisation of an evolution
of Thought.* In the matter of later research into
&quot;nervous organisations&quot; and so forth, he is full of
surprise and admiration at Bain ; in the conception of
Development, he is full of surprise and admiration at
Comte. These are exactly the characteristics of a man
who forms a link between two phases of a philosophical
system, who connects together Sensationalism and
* In
&quot; Comte and Positivism.&quot;154 THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
Scientific Empiricism. A follower of Hume, lie yet





: a pioneer of Herbert
Spencer and Lewes, he admires from a distance bio
logical analysis, and historical evolution.
For, to those who are conversant with later specu
lations, it is clear that the relation between Idealism
and Sensationalism is a somewhat different matter to
the attitude which the metaphysician must adopt
before the scientific empiricism and biology of the
later school. In this particular instance of hereditary
transmission of
&quot;
Forms,&quot; it is of course, open to an
objector to say that it only puts the difficulty a stage
farther back, and that we norc want to know how the
first man who opened his eyes on the natural world
proceeded to systematise his experience, whereas we
took before, a man of the present time, to serve as
subject for psychological analysis. But it is clear that
such an answer will not be in any way satisfactory to
the biologist, nor does it show much comprehension
of the bearings of Evolution. For the reply that will
be made will be that Intelligence is itself based, by
Evolution, on Instinct, and Instinct on still lower
automatic functions, and that consequently
&quot; Mental
forms&quot; were, possibly, in process of construction in
much lower organisms than Man. That the meta
physician has his own unanswerable analysis of Con
sciousness, and Relativity of Knowledge, is, of course,EPILOGUE. 155
undoubted ; if it were proved, perfectly incontestably,
that man is developed from apes, or skin-bags, it is
none the less true that the consciousness which makes
us men, is independent of time and development
: but
that the methods of Empiricism in the hands of a
Lewes, are not the same as those in the hands of a
Mill, is a point which, though clear enough (especially
after a perusal of the imitators of Spencer), seems to
have been hardly sufficiently considered. Just in the
same way, Scientific Materialism has its own special
views in Ethical theory,* which are by no means the
same as the Ethics of Mill, a point which is equally
forgotten by those, who think that in answering
utilitarianism, they are answering the moral problems
of physiologists. Evolution and




as much part in Ethics, as they do in
problems of knowledge.
It is this transitional character of Mill s philo
sophical system which makes it, as it seems to me,
so imperfect an instrument of education. For the
belief is common that Mill is the modern experi
mental philosopher par excellence, that in his various
works we may find the most recent and best accredited
utterances of the experimental school. For this,
however, we ought rather to turn to Herbert Spencer










&quot; Body and Mind.&quot;loo THE METAPHYSICS OF MILL.
to a large extent, exempted from such criticism, but
only because, to a large extent, it disavows the
metaphysical foundation of the
&quot; Examination.&quot; Yet
even here, in those Logical questions which depend
upon metaphysical considerations, as the question of
General Ideas, and Abstraction, and possibly, too, the
theory of Real Kinds in Nature, the instability of the
foundation will make itself felt. And, at all events,
the student of Mill s
&quot;
Logic
&quot; cannot well be debarred
from the study of Mill s deeper, fundamental in
quiries. For, as Mill says, with a prophetic insight,
of which possibly he did not see the full application,
&quot; the difficulties of Metaphysics lie at the root of all
Science.&quot;
THE END.
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